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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
: District Case No. 031402469 
AMADOR SANTONIO, 
: Appellate No. 20090359-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a finding of guilt of Aggravated Assault, a third-degree 
felony in violation of UCA §76-5-103; Disarming a Peace Officer, a first-degree 
felony in violation of UCA §76-5-102.8; Assault on a Peace Officer, a Class A 
misdemeanor in violation of UCA §76-5-102.4; and Interfering with Legal Arrest, a 
Class B misdemeanor in violation of UCA §76-8-305. The Defendant was found 
guilty at a jury trial on March 20, 2008. He was sentenced March 25, 2009, to an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years on the aggravated assault charge to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years which may be for life on the disarming a 
police officer conviction. The sentences are to be served consecutively at the Utah 
State Prison, and Defendant was given credit for time served by the Honorable 
Claudia Lay cock of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WERE THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COUNSEL 
VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO 
REQUIRE THE JAIL TO FACILITATE CONFIDENTIAL 
ATTORNEY CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS, AND BY THE 
TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND BY THE TRIAL 
COURTS RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT MUST PROCEED 
TO TRIAL PRO SE? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by a hearing with objection by 
defendant, as well as by the defendant filing a Motion for Arrest of Judgment. 
Standard of Review: Whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. While we 
review questions of law for correctness, a trial court's factual findings may be 
reversed on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 
f23, 137 P.3d 716, 721. The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court, 
which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
determination. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) 
POINT II 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN 
JUDGE DAVIS SUMMARILY FOUND DEFENDANT IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR NOT APPEARING AT A COURT 
HEARING, SET A FIXED AND UNCONDITIONAL FINE 
AGAINST DEFENDANT TO BE PAID TO THE COURT, AND 
DENIED DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND 
AGAINST THE CONTEMPT CHARGE? 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by a timely filing of a Motion 
to Amend or Alter a Judgment (dated August 30, 2006) and appeal 20061137 CA. 
Standard of Review: Due process challenges are questions of law that we 
review applying a correction of error standard. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct.App.1991). If the due process claim presents a 
mixed question of fact and law...we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard for the 
necessary subsidiary factual determinations. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14 | 35, 152 
P.3d 321, 329 -330. The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that 
we review for correctness." State v, Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f 11, 218 P.3d 610. 
POINT III 
DID JUDGE LAYCOCK MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE AND MISAPPLY A LEGAL PRECEPT IN HER 
ORDER OF NOVEMBER 13, 2006, WHICH UPHOLDS THE 
FINDING OF CONTEMPT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by filing of a Motion to 
Amend or Alter Judgment. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal of this motion 
which was dismissed on the grounds that this was not a final order. Therefore, the 
issue was preserved pending the finality of a sentencing order. 
Standard of Review: In cases involving mixed questions of fact and law where 
the judge makes a determination on contested facts, we view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling and reverse only if the necessary factual 
findings implicit in the court's ruling lack sufficient evidentiary support. State v. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991). "In reviewing the application of the law to 
those facts and findings, we apply a correctness standard and reverse if the legal 
standard is not satisfied." Id. 
POINT IV 
DID JUDGE LAYCOCK ERR IN FORMULATING OR 
APPLYING A LEGAL PRECEPT WHEN, IN ORDERING A 
REDIRECTION OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE MENTAL 
CONDITION OF THE DEFENDANT, THE JUDGE ORDERED 
THE PSYCHOLOGIST TO RE-INTERVIEW AND RE-
EVALUATE DEFENDANT TO ADDRESS THE CRITERIA 
"DID THE DEFENDANT, AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, 
SUFFER FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS, AS DEFINED U.C.A. 
§76-2-305(4)(A), THAT PREVENTED HIM FROM FORMING 
THE INTENT TO INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY OR 
RECKLESSLY COMMIT THE CRIMES WITH WHICH HE IS 
CHARGED? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by verbal objection on the 
record and timely filing of a motion to suppress and limit testimony (of those doctors) 
and a motion for new evaluations. 
Standard of Review: We have long held that the determination whether to 
order a psychological examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge 
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Lairby, 
699 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Utah 1984); State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86 [^22 55 P.3d 573. 
An abuse of discretion occurs only when it is "clear that the actions of the judge were 
... inherently unfair" State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App.1991). 
POINT V 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE 
DISTRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT ACCESS TO THE 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PHOTO COMPUTER DISC WHICH HELD THE CRIME SCENE 
PHOTOS, WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS ACTING IN A PRO 
SE CAPACITY, AND NEEDED ACCESS TO THESE 
DOCUMENTS TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL AND PRESENT A 
DEFENSE? 
Presei*vation of Issue: This issue was preserved by the filing of a timely 
objection (1-23-2007 docket). 
Standard of Review: Due process challenges are questions of law that we 
review applying a correction of error standard. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct.App.1991). While a trial court is generally allowed 
broad discretion in granting or denying discovery, see State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 
1027 (Utah 1982), "[t]he proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of 
law, and we review the trial court's decision for correctness." Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 
UT 99, \ 5, 989 P.2d 1073; see also State v. Spry, 2001 UT App. 75, 21 P.3d 675. 
POINT VI 
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT ADMITTING TRIAL EXHIBIT 
#2, A UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE REPORT BEARING 
ON EVENTS THAT OCCURRED AT THE TIME OF ARREST, 
AND TRIAL EXHIBIT #8, A UTAH STATE CRIME LAB 
REPORT INDICATING THAT UNDER VISUAL AND 
CHEMICAL TESTS THERE WAS NO BLOOD DETECTED ON 
THE KNIFE REPORTEDLY FOUND AT THE ARREST SCENE? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by the timely motion to admit 
the evidence, which was denied by trial court. 
Standard of Review: Rules of evidence are interpreted according to general 
rales of statutory construction. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 
1997). Where a rule's language is plain and unambiguous we will not look beyond the 
5 
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rule itself for meaning. See id. A trial court errs when it rules contrary to an 
evidentiary rule's plain meaning; however, an "erroneous decision to admit or exclude 
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is harmful." Jones v. 
Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). "Harmful error occurs 
where the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the error is sufficiently 
high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Butler v. Nay lor, 987 P.2d 41, 
43 (Utah, 1999). Because "[a] trial court's rulings on the admission of evidence ... 
generally entail a good deal of discretion[,] ... [we] will not reverse the trial court's 
ruling on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood that an injustice resulted." State v. Powell, 2007 
UT9,1fl3, 154P.3d788. 
THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT AND 
INCLUDED IN ADDENDUM D AS PERMITTED BY THE COURT'S 
SPECIAL RULING. 
POINT VII 
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT ADMITTING TRIAL EXHIBIT 
#28, A CERTIFIED COPY OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
RELATING TO AN ADJUDICATION OF A MENTAL DISEASE 
OR DEFECT OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, WHICH 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD PREVIOUSLY TAKEN JUDICIAL 
NOTE OF DURING THE PROCEEDING OF THE CASE, WHEN 
IT HAD BEEN OFFERED BY THE STATE; AND TRIAL 
EXHIBIT #29, A MEMORANDUM DECISIONS REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY IN WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT HAD MADE A FINDING THAT 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT CONTINUED TO SUFFER FROM 
A MENTAL ILLNESS? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by the timely request by the 
defendant to admit this evidence in trial 
Standard of Review: Rules of evidence are interpreted according to general 
rules of statutoiy construction. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 
1997). Where a rule's language is plain and unambiguous we will not look beyond the 
rule itself for meaning. See Id. A trial court errs when it rules contrary to an 
evidentiary rule's plain meaning; however, an "erroneous decision to admit or exclude 
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is harmful." Jones v. 
Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). "Harmful error occurs 
where the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the error is sufficiently 
high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Butler v. Naylor, 987 P.2d 41, 
43 (Utah,1999). 
POINT VIII 
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT GIVING DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION #14.2 REGARDING THE 
STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "ATTEMPT" AS STATED IN 
U.C.A. §76-4-101? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by filing a Motion for 
proposed jury instructions. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling concerning a jury instruction is 
reviewed for correctness. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 466 
(Utah 1996). A new trial will not be granted unless any error of the trial court was 
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prejudicial, meaning that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law. See Vitale v. 
Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). Butler v. Naylor, 987 P.2d 
41, 43 (Utah, 1999). 
POINT IX 
DID JUDGE LAYCOCK ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by the filing of a timely 
appeal. 
Standard of Review: We review the denial of Defendant's motion [to arrest 
judgment] for abuse of discretion. State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App. 264, | 10 167 
P.3d 516. When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of arrest of 
judgment, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be 
drawn there from in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Workman, 
852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). 
POINTX 
WAS DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL VIOLATED BY THE NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT 
OCCURRED AT TRIAL? 
Preservation of Issue: These issues were preserved by Defendant's many 
objections at trial and the motions filed as outlined in Points I-IX above. 
Standard of Review: The appellate court must determine whether the 
cumulative effect of the errors during the trial deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. 
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if ;the cumulative effect of 
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the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. 
ColwelU 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000)(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d262, 277 (Utah 
1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right 
to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the 
use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined 
by statute or rule. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§4-2-9. Appointment. (See Addendum B) 
§4-2-10. State chemist responsibilities. (See Addendum B) 
§70A-2-204(l). Formation in general. (See Addendum B) 
§76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. (See Addendum B) 
§76-2-305(4)(a). Mental illness - Use as a defense — Influence of alcohol or other 
substance voluntarily consumed — Definition. (See Addendum B) 
§76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense. (See Addendum B) 
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§76-5-102,4. Assault against peace officer or a military service member in 
uniform — Penalty. (See Addendum B) 
§76-5-103. Aggravated assault. (See Addendum B) 
§76-5-102.8. Disarming a peace officer. (See Addendum B) 
§ 76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer or a military service member in 
uniform — Penalty. (See Addendum B) 
§76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. (See Addendum B) 
§77-16a-301. Mental examination of defendant (See Addendum B) 
§78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. (See Addendum B) 
§78B-6-301(5). Acts and omissions constituting contempt. (See Addendum B) 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 504. See attached Addendum C 
Rule 704. See attached Addendum C. 
Rule 803. See attached Addendum C. 
Rule 901. See attached Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 27, 2008, Defendant was charged by information. The charges were 
eventually reduced to Aggravated Assault, a third-degree felony; Disarming a Peace 
Officer, a first-degree felony; Threatening With or Using a Dangerous Weapon in a 
Fight, a class A misdemeanor; Assault Against a Peace Officer, a class A 
misdemeanor; and Interference with Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor. 
After two competency challenges and several problems arising around the issue 
of selection of counsel, a preliminary hearing was held on August 30, 2007. 
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Defendant was arraigned on September 5, 2007, and again on September 12, 2007, 
when the court finally accepted Defendant's plea of not guilty and, in the alternative, 
not guilty by reason of insanity. 
After a three day jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 
(Threatening With or Using a Dangerous Weapon was dismissed on a motion by the 
state). Defendant was sentenced on March 25, 2009, to a term of five years, which 
may be for life, and a term of zero to five years in prison, both to be served 
consecutively in the Utah State Prison, along with concurrent sentences on the 
misdemeanor offenses, also to be served at the Utah State Prison. 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on April 17, 2009, pursuant to Rule 4(g) 
with a mailing date of April 20, 2009, pursuant to state stipulation. (R. 2859) A 
Motion for Arrest of Judgment was filed on February 4, 2009 (R. 2774), and that 
motion was argued and denied on March 11, 2009 (R. 2850). The court filed a 
Findings of Fact and Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment on May 1, 
2009 (R. 2863) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Section 1. (As it relates to denial of choice of and assistance of counsel) 
(1) Defendant contends his difficulties in retaining counsel were 
compounded by the fact that he was housed in solitary confinement for two years and 
eight months, during which time he had access to phone at a maximum of one hour 
per day. That one hour was not always during times when attorneys were available. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Also, an inaccurate docket entiy (R. 0008) reports a finding of indigency when in 
reality the public defender was appointed only to assist Defendant in obtaining 
reading glasses because he could not read the information. 
(2) Defendant was denied contact attorney visits and was only able to 
contact attorneys over a phone that was monitored by deputies (Defendant has been 
questioned by deputies after attorney visits about issues discussed during those 
attorney visits just moments after said visits). 
(3) Defendant made repeated motions to the court for contact attorney visits 
(R. 0062, R. 0549), moved the court (R. 0372) for assistance in mailing legal 
documents and motioned the court for unmonitored phone calls to attorneys (see 
Exhibit "C" of Defendant's motion for arrest of judgment, R. 2774). However, the 
interference with Defendant's efforts to engage in the process of selection of counsel 
continued and the motions for contact attorney visits were denied. (R. 2961/83) 
(4) Defendant did manage to contact an attorney a few months after his 
arrest, but that attorney was unable to arrange a contact visit to ensure confidentiality. 
(5) That attorney did, however, assist Defendant in contacting a reputable 
attorney in the area, and the second attorney did make a special appearance in the case 
based on a verbal agreement that included the first attorney being involved in certain 
investigative work in this case. This attorney, under the pretext of assisting Defendant 
in moving money to a new bank account in Utah County, presented Defendant with 
several pages of documents requesting his signature, including the second page of a 
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three page document. On one of the unpresented pages of that document was a new 
attorney-client agreement which included the provision that said attorney would not 
refund Defendant's retainer should Defendant fire him. The attorney then deposited 
the money intended to open Defendant's new bank account into his business account 
and quit taking Defendant's phone calls. The attorney was later disbarred and such 
becoming known added to the problem of retaining local counsel. 
(6) On August 24, 2004, Ms. Jennifer Go wans was present in court at the 
request of the court as potential conflict attorney. However, she was never assigned 
and has a conflict with Defendant which attaches to her law firm. 
(7) Defendant reported these and other problems concerning attorney and 
access to the law to understand his legal situation at a hearing. (R. 2961/7-22) (See 
Addendum E.) 
(8) Defendant thereafter exerted great care in approaching attorneys and 
found that many attorneys in Utah County were unwilling to entertain the 
representation. Also, Defendant filed an action in U.S. District Court for deprivation 
of civil rights, naming Judge Davis as a defendant. However, without access to 
adequate law library, Defendant was unable to present an effective argument. Only a 
few months before trial (in December 2006) did the jail acquire a computer law 
library that allowed adequate research. (Defendant still claims an inadequate amount 
of time for the task facing Defendant.) 
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(9) On April 4, 2005, the court ordered that Defendant be transported to the 
Utah County Law Library for four hours per week until June 27, 2005, hearing set for 
9:00 a.m. (docket p. 38) 
(10) The week ending June 24, 2005 (Friday) and during Defendant's law 
library visit, Defendant's legal papers, which were back in his jail cell, were moved 
and showed signs of having been gone through. Defendant claimed some were 
missing. The Defendant believed this to be inappropriate because those papers 
contained confidential information pertaining to Defendant's legal defenses and for 
the reason that the deputies that searched those papers were close associates of the 
reported victims of Defendant's charges. 
(11) On June 24, 2005, the state filed a motion to continue scheduling 
conference stating that both Mr. Sant and Mr. Probert, the then prosecutors assigned 
to the case, had medical appointments and that they would be unable to attend. (R. 
0992) 
(12) On June 27, 2005, when Defendant was called to court, he reported his 
belief that the hearing was canceled and, in fear of protecting his legal papers, 
requested to not go to court, offering to show the state's motion to continue. The 
docket reflects the jail's report that Defendant refused to be transported rather than 
Defendant's belief that the state's motion would be granted, negating the need to go to 
court and allowing Defendant to protect his legal papers, which were too many for 
him to take to court. 
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The docket quotes the judge as stating, "The court had previously denied the 
state's motion to continue and will proceed to set the matter for a preliminary 
hearing." However, this is not possible since the state's motion was filed on Friday, 
the hearing was on the next Monday and the docket reflects no activity to support the 
judge's contention that the state's motion had been previously denied. Also, the 
setting of the preliminary hearing without addressing Defendant's reported 
interference with attorney-client confidentiality, has not afforded Defendant an 
opportunity to exercise his right to choice of counsel. 
(13) On July 11, 2005, at the scheduled preliminary hearing, the court finds 
Defendant has waived his right to counsel and allows Defendant to represent himself. 
Shortly thereafter, the court appoints legal counsel and continues the preliminary 
hearing. (R. 2964) 
(14) On July 18, 2005, the Utah County Public Defenders Association filed 
an Opposition to Appointment for Counsel for Defendant. (R. 1068) 
(15) On July 19, 2005, the State filed a Response to Utah County Public 
Defenders Association's Opposition to Appointment as Counsel for Defendant. And 
later that same day, the Public Defenders Association files a Reply to State's 
Response. (R. 1086) 
(16) On July 21, 2005, the Defendant filed another objection to appointment, 
and on July 22, 2005, a telephone conference between the court, the State, and the 
Public Defenders Association is held without Defendant. (R. 1096) 
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(17) On July 26, 2005, a hearing was held and argument heard. The court 
then took the matter under advisement. (R. 1103) 
(18) On July 29, 2005, the court ruled in favor of the Public Defenders 
Association and set the matter for a scheduling conference on August 12, 2005. (R. 
1117) 
(19) On August 12, 2005, Mr. Willis of the Utah County Attorney's office -
Civil Division, appeared in court and outlined a proposal for an advertisement 
requesting bids for the representation of the Defendant to attorneys in the Salt Lake 
City area. This proposal was to be in consultation with Defendant. (R. 1129) 
(20) On September 8, 2005, the State filed its second petition to inquire into 
Defendant's competency. (R. 1138) On October 11, 2005, at a hearing, the court 
stops all proceedings in the matter pending the appointment of counsel. (R. 1179) 
(21) In the state's October 18, 2005, memorandum on legal representation, 
(R. 1185/1) the state recounts, "Mr. Willis informed the court that the proposal to 
advertise for an attorney to represent Defendant, in consultation with the Defendant." 
(22) On December 5, 2005, a Mr. Gaither enters an appearance without 
Defendant's knowledge or approval. (R. 1219) On December 7, 2005, Mr. Gaither 
engages in a telephone conference with the court hearing this case. (R. 1230) 
(23) On December 20, 2005, Defendant met with Mr. Gaither prior to the 
hearing and was informed that the judge made the selection without consulting with 
Defendant. At the hearing, the judge claims the selection came from Mr. Willis. 
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Defendant had not completed the consultation process with the other attorneys and 
from the comments of Gaither believed that Gaither had selected himself. Defendant 
expressed the belief that there was a conflict, and Mr. Gaither moved the court to 
withdraw as counsel. The court then continued the matter to allow Defendant to 
obtain private counsel. 
(24) Defendant was still in solitary confinement and was being handcuffed 
and shackled on leaving his jail cell. In a January 24, 2006, filing of a memorandum 
with the court, Defendant outlined how this cuffing process has been used to 
physically abuse the Defendant causing substantial bodily injury. (R. 1242) 
(25) On January 26, 2006, Defendant stipulated to a competency evaluation 
while he continued his efforts to find counsel willing to identify with the interest of 
Defendant and prosecute such defenses as are available. Of the remaining attorneys 
referred to Defendant by Mr. Willis, one reported a relational conflict and the other 
lost interest in the representation. 
(26) On March 6, 2006, the Defendant filed with the court a memorandum 
regarding campaign of harassment, (R. 1286) and on June 7, 2006, a motion for 
preliminary injunction seeking to stop the jail deputies from using this cuffing process 
to physically abuse Defendant. (R. 1363) 
(27) On September 11, 2006, the case was assigned to Judge Laycock (R. 
1534) and on September 25, 2006, Defendant mailed to the court two motions, an 
objection to proposed order and a letter-form motion for recusal, titled status of the 
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case. The objection was filed on September 26, 2006, (R. 1568) and the status motion 
for recusal was not filed until October 6, 2006 (R. 1616). 
(28) On November 13, 2006, Judge Laycock made a verbal order that 
Defendant be allowed twenty-five unmonitored phone calls at the jail to attorneys as 
part of the process of selection of counsel. (See Addendum E, R. 2970/17-23): 
(29) On December 4, 2006, Defendant moved the court for an order 
compelling the jail to afford said "unmonitored" phone calls. (R. 1721) And at that 
hearing the judge issued a written order to that effect. (See Addendum E, R. 2971/4-9) 
(30) On December 13, 2006, Defendant wrote to Judge Laycock reporting the 
jail's further failure to comply with the judge's order and the other interference with 
Defendant's efforts to engage in the process of selection of counsel. (R. 1733) 
(31) On December 20, 2006, Defendant filed a memorandum and notice 
reporting continued interference with attempts to secure counsel (See Addendum E, 
R. 2972/2-12). 
(32) Without access to confidentiality with attorneys, Defendant prepared 
several documents for submittal including a Motion to Address Barriers to Process of 
Selecting Counsel; Memorandum Re: Barriers; and an affidavit (R. 1798 R. 1800). 
The competency hearing was held on Febmary 2, 2007, and continued on February 
23, 2007. (See Addendum E, R. 2972/2-12) 
(33) However, at the hearing where the court makes its findings of waiver by 
conduct, there is no offer of proof through judicial notice, no exhibits nor testimony to 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
support the court's factual findings which have been gleaned from the docket, nor is 
Defendant given an opportunity to rebut the court's assumptions relating to prior 
counsel. 
(34) Additionally, Exhibit #71025 (R. 2774) demonstrates Defendant's 
further efforts to secure counsel and the interference thereof. 
Section II. (As it relates to contempt of court) 
(35) In the week prior to the court citing Defendant for contempt, Defendant 
was scheduled for court on August 7, 2007. When Defendant was not called for court 
with the other morning court appearances, Defendant showed his copy of the court's 
"Minute Entry" to the morning deputy and asked him to contact transportation and 
alert them to the mistake of not calling Defendant to court. The deputy stated he was 
unable to at that time. However, a short time later, that deputy did contact 
transportation, reporting that Defendant was scheduled for court in the afternoon. 
With the assistance of the deputy, Defendant was taken to court for Defendant's 8:30 
a.m. court appearance. That mistake was readily corrected. 
(36) However, on August 14, 2006, Defendant was called to court in the 
morning when Defendant's copy of the court's "Minute Entry" showed Defendant 
was scheduled at 2:30 p.m. Again Defendant approached the morning deputy and 
asked that transportation be contacted and alerted to the discrepancy. That deputy 
refused. Defendant waited a short time and again asked that deputy to contact 
transportation. 
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(37) At lunch, Defendant asked another deputy to contact transportation and 
alert them to what Defendant believed was the correct time. (R. 1497) 
(38) Defendant made a good faith effort to appear at court at what Defendant 
believed was the correct time. Defendant's efforts were reasonable and calculated to 
succeed based on prior experience. 
(39) Defendant had no agreement (or promise) to appear at that hearing. 
Very early in the case, Defendant realized that the deputies at the jail were close 
personal associates of the alleged victims. Deputies have demonstrated a will and an 
ability to obstruct the legal efforts of Defendant. For three years Defendant has 
declined to sign a "promise to appear" (see the docket) paying heed to the philosophy 
that "a man of his word, give his word seldom, because he knows how hard it is to 
keep his word." Since Defendant cannot effect the ultimate outcome of "appearance", 
the signing of a promise to appear works to trivialize the mental process of making a 
commitment. 
(40) At the October 2, 2006, hearing on Defendant's Motion to Amend or 
Alter a Judgment, Defendant first discovered that the copy of the "Minute Entry" in 
Defendant's possession reflected an incorrect time, as reflected in the transcript of the 
hearing. (See Addendum E, R. 2969/11) 
(41) Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on November 26, 2006, which was 
assigned (after some confusion) #20061137 (R. 1773); and a Memorandum decision 
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was issued March 29, 2007, (R. 1873) declaring that the court's order was not a final 
order. 
Section III. (As it relates to redirection of mental evaluation) 
(42) On September 5, 2007, at arraignment, Defendant pled not guilty and, 
pursuant to U.C.A. §77-16a-301, in the alternative, not guilty by reason of insanity, 
both verbally and in writing by a Notice of Affirmative Defense. (R. 2128) The court 
refused to accept the plea and rescheduled the arraignment for September 12, 2007. 
At that hearing, the court accepted Defendant's not guilty and alternative plea. 
(43) On September 25, 2007, the court filed an "Order for Evaluation, 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-301." (R. 2164) Defendant then filed a Motion 
for Amended Order, dated September 26, 2007, (R. 2168) as reflected on the docket 
on the 28th. On October 3, 2007, an "Amended Order for Evaluation Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-16a-301" was filed by the court (R. 2177) granting Defendant's 
motion but again, not reflected on the docket (these documents are included in the 
Addendum for the court's convenience.) 
(44) The report (on Defendant's mental condition) from Dr. Wootton, is filed 
with the court on October 18, 2007, as reflected by the docket. (R. 2947) 
(45) The forensic evaluation by John Malouf, Ph.D. is filed with the court on 
November 2, 2007, as also reflected on the docket. (R. 2948) 
(46) The docket reflects that on November 6, 2007, a Motion to Redirect 
Evaluation of Defendant was filed but incorrectly attributing said motion to 
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Defendant. (R. 2210) An examination of that document (included in the addendum) 
clearly shows it was submitted by the state. It displays a date of September 24, 2007, 
but addresses the report of Dr. Wootton which was not known to the court until 
October 18, 2007. Defendant was given the motion just moments before the hearing 
and was denied the statutory time to respond to the state's motion. The court granted 
the motion and issued a "Second Amended Order for Evaluation, Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-16a~30r on November 8, 2007 (R. 2217). 
(47) Defendant submitted a "Motion for New Evaluations" (R. 2270) and a 
"Motion to Suppress and Limit Testimony" on December 3, 2007 (R. 2280). And on 
December 23, 2007, submitted a Memorandum in Support of Suppression/New 
Evaluations. (R. 2432) This issue was argued and denied on January 23, 2008; a 
written ruling was to be prepared by the State. (R. 2479) No ruling was ever 
submitted. 
Section IV. (As it relates to access to photo disc) 
(48) On November 26, 2007, the court filed Defendant's Motion for Access 
to Disc Checked into Evidence, (R. 2243) attaching as an exhibit, the Utah County 
Sheriffs office report which was later offered at trial as Exhibit #2. Defendant sought 
a copy of this photo computer disc to develop exculpatory evidence relating to, among 
other things, a discrepancy among the photos which suggested that crime scene photos 
had been staged at a later date. 
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(49) On December 28, 2007, the court filed Defendant's Memorandum Re: 
Access to Disc...Sign-in Sheet and Suppress Evidence. (R. 2418) The issue was 
ruled upon January 14, 2008, and denied. (R. 2471) A Notice of Objections was filed 
January 23, 2008. (R. 2476) 
Section V, (As it relates to trial errors.) 
(50) Again on November 21, 2007, the Defendant submitted proposed jury 
instructions to the court, including proposed jury instructions #14.2, the statutory 
definition of "attempt." (Defendant's copy of the instruction and certificate of 
mailing is included in Addendum for court's convenience.) 
(51) Defendant contends by the exclusion of competent evidence (as in 
Exhibits #2, 8, 28 and 29) and by the exclusion of jury instructions (as in proposed 
jury instruction #14.2) the jury was mislead or misadvised. 
(52) The trial transcript of March 20, 2008, morning session reflects that the 
jury instructions did at one time include an "attempt" instruction. It would also 
appear that it was removed. (See Addendum E, R. 2980/10-11) 
(53) On the first day of trial, March 17, 2008, at the p.m. session, Defendant 
attempted to introduce Exhibit #8, a State Crime Lab report indicating there was no 
blood detected on the knife collected at the crime scene, (R. 2971/44-49) and made 
another attempt to introduce it on day three at the a.m. session. However, in a ruling 
at the bench and off the record that exhibit was again rejected. (R. 2980/97-98) 
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(54) On the third day of trial, March 20, Defendant offered into evidence 
Exhibit #28, a certified copy of the finding of facts and conclusions of law in the U.S. 
District Court relating to an adjudication of a mental disease or defect of the 
Defendant and that exhibit was rejected. (R. 2980/39-44) 
(55) Also on the third day of trial, Defendant offered into evidence Exhibit 
#29, a Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Competency, which the court rejected. 
(R. 2980/45) 
(56) Defendant also offered into evidence Exhibit #2, a Utah County Sheriffs 
Office report, which the court rejected. (R. 2980/54-55) 
Section VI. (As it relates to the Motion for Arrest of Judgment) 
(57) On June 18, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Verdict and other 
post-trial motions. (R. 2623-2625) And on July 30, 2008, Defendant, then meeting 
the criteria for indigency, filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (R. 2684) 
Transcripts were ordered and issues of a conflict of interest were addressed. During 
this time, Defendant worked mostly with three different BYU law students and 
became convinced as to certain legal arguments. 
(58) On January 30, 2009, Defendant mailed a pro se version of a Motion for 
Arrest of Judgment to the court. (R. 2835) And on February 18, 2009, the public 
defender withdrew as counsel and the state was directed to respond to Defendant's 
motion. (R. 2844) The Defendant's motion was argued on March 11, 2009, and 
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denied. (R. 2850) The court was unaware that Defendant had filed a proposed jury 
instruction on the legal definition of "attempt" and on that basis denies the motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant raises ten points on appeal. First, the Defendant was denied a 
fair opportunity to retain counsel of his choice, and was thereby denied "choice of 
counsel." This occurred when the court was advised of the interference with the 
attorney/client relationship by the jail but did not seek to enforce its own order to the 
jail, that Defendant have unmonitored phone calls to attorneys, and by the trial court 
not taking into account the mental health issues of the Defendant in allowing a pro se 
representation. 
Second, the contempt alleged was criminal in nature and as such Defendant had 
certain rights constitutional due process rights which attach and were not afforded. 
Third, Judge Lay cock's ruling to uphold the contempt charge which was 
obtained in violation of due process rights due to the court not allowing Defendant to 
raise issues such as advice of counsel, the defense of mental illness or mistake of fact. 
Fourth, the ruling to redirect the mental evaluation of the Defendant was made 
on the same day the motion was filed, the redirection used a criteria more limiting 
than the statute, and as such worked to eliminate an affirmative defense of the 
Defendant. Further, the absence of the original order of evaluation (of 9-25-2007), the 
Amended order for Evaluation (of 10-3-2007) and the mistaken attributing of the 
Motion to Re-Direct... as Defendant's motion (see docket entry of 11-07-2007) all 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
thwarted the Defendant's attempt to represent himself and present his theory of the 
case to the jury. The denial by the trial court to allow the Defendant to present his 
theory of the case violated the Defendant's due process rights as guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Fifth, the trial court's refusal to allow a pro se Defendant to examine computer 
stored data of the disc which held the crime scene photos and potentially held 
information exculpatory for Defendant and which could be used to impeach the trial 
statements of witnesses was error. 
Sixth, the trial court erred in not admitting trial exhibits #2 and #8, which 
clearly meet a standard previously approved by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Seventh, the trial court erred in not admitting trial exhibits #28 and #29, which 
clearly meet the standard for judicial notice. (See proposed exhibits #8 and #28 
attached as Addendum H and Addendum I.) 
Eighth, the trial court erred in not giving an instruction on the statutory 
definition of "attempt" as stated in U.C.A. §76-4-101 and that such is reversible error 
as a matter of law. 
Ninth, the judge erred in not following the prior established precedents of the 
law and granting the motion for arrest of judgment. 
And tenth, the effect of the numerous errors made by the trial court undermines 
the confidence of the reasonable person that a fair trial was had and that remand to 
another jurisdiction is appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COUNSEL 
WERE VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO 
REQUIRE THE JAIL TO FACILITATE CONFIDENTIAL 
ATTORNEY CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS, AND BY THE 
TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND BY THE TRIAL 
COURTS RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT MUST PROCEED 
TO TRIAL PRO SE. 
In the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), the 
Supreme Court of the United States stated, "Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
criminal proceedings applies to states through Fourteenth Amendment. See also 
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 544 U.S. 191 (2008) "...adversarial judicial 
proceedings have begun and the right to counsel has thus attached, with the 
Defendant's'initial appearance before a judicial officer.'" 
In Faretta v. California, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534 (1975), 422 U.S. 806, the court 
enumerated, "It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and 
present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make 
binding decision of trial strategy in many areas. (Citations omitted) This allocation 
can only be justified.. .by defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his 
representative. 
The criteria for acceptance has been stated in State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 
(Utah 1976), where the court held, "...an accused is entitled to assistance of a 
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competent member of the bar who shows a willingness to identify himself with the 
interests of the accused and present such defenses as are available." 
Confidentiality is a right guaranteed by constitution and statute. State v. 
Johnson, 2008 Ut.App. 5, 178 P.3d 915, 920-21 (2008), points out that "the [attorney-
client] privilege is recognized in [r]ule 504 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. And again, 
"Utah R. Evid. 504(b), 'the attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage candor 
between attorney and client, and promote the best possible representation of the 
client.'" 
"It is perfectly clear that once privileged material is disclosed [without claiming 
the privilege], the privilege on non-disclosure is waived." State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 
86,90(UtahCt.Appl998). 
In Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land and Livestock,.., Inc., 456 F.2d 996, 1000 
(C.A. 1972), the U.S. District Court (in Utah) in reviewing the legality of a 
contractual agreement stated, "The important factor is whether the parties arrived at a 
meeting of the minds." (Citing Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-204(l).) 
Thus, we must reasonably conclude that an inmate seeking to secure counsel, 
and keep confidential the information that candid communications would necessarily 
reveal, would first seek to secure for himself confidentiality in communications with 
potential counsel. It would also logically follow that Judge Davis's ruling of August 
30, 2004 (R. 0656/93) when delineating when and how defendant may meet with 
potential counsel and stating, "it's subject to the rules and regulations of the...Utah 
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County Jail, and I'm not going to disturb those," that such a ruling would have a 
chilling effect on Defendant's efforts concerning the retaining of counsel until he had 
secured a means of communicating confidentially with potential counsel. Defendant 
was then forced to accept Judge Davis's invitation to bring these issues to federal 
court. 
It is instructive to the issue of denial of the Defendant's fundamental 
constitutional rights demonstrated by the federal lawsuit against the jail and Judge 
Davis (state district court is the correct court for seeking declaratory relief), which led 
to the recusal of Judge Davis two years later, in attempting to understand the 
frustration of the Defendant that resulted in a pro se representation during later phases 
of the proceedings. The rulings by Judge Davis and Judge Lay cock resulted in the 
Defendant being forced to represent himself in trial. The trial court was well aware of 
the Defendant's mental health conditions and how they impacted his ability to 
reasonably choose counsel. This understanding is demonstrated by rulings of Judge 
Lay cock who first makes a verbal order that defendant be allowed 25 "unmonitored" 
phone calls to attorneys (R. 2970/17-23), then later is unwilling to seek enforcement 
of that order, but rather (R. 2972/2-12) suggests Defendant hire an attorney to assist 
him in hiring an attorney. It is precisely this knowledge by the trial court which 
underpins the Defendant's contention that he was denied his constitutional right to 
counsel. 
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Exhibit C of Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment is a copy of jail policy 
#506(3)(b), which states, "Attorneys will not be allowed contact visits unless pre-
approved by the jail commander." And Exhibit 71025 (of that same Motion for Arrest 
of Judgment) establish as fact that Defendant had exhausted a grievance about this 
policy in 2006, had made other attempts to enjoy attorney/client confidential 
communications, and that those attempts were denied. For the court to then take the 
position that it would not micromanage the jail and would in essence allow the jail to 
dictate which constitutional rights a defendant can enjoy is error. As such, defendant 
was not afforded the fair opportunity dictated in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 
S.Ct. 2557, 2561 (2006) and was by this erroneously denied choice of counsel. 
Defendant believes that the trial court's finding "that he had waived the right to 
counsel" through dilatory conduct was erroneous. Further, that the finding that 
Defendant uhas rejected...female appointed counsel in this case" was untrue. 
Therefore, the court's ruling that the Defendant had waived his right to counsel was in 
error. The female attorney was called to court by Judge Davis, without Defendant's 
Imowledge and upon review, it was learned that the Defendant had earlier contacted a 
principle of that fmn and discovered a conflict which attached to that law firm, such 
could never amount to an appointment and subsequent rejection by Defendant. The 
trial courts finding that the Defendant's rejection of another attorney who responded 
to a bid proposal, and then entered an appearance without Defendant's knowledge or 
consent, and without the benefit of meeting with the Defendant and engaging in 
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communications regarding his entry cannot fairly be characterized as a rejection of 
appointed counsel. 
The trial court had at its disposal significant information regarding the 
Defendant's mental health condition, particularly his paranoia regarding assistance of 
counsel. The trial court should have inquired into the basis for Defendant's 
dissatisfaction with the counsel in question. 
It is a troubling proposition to suggest that a trial court be allowed to declare 
that a defendant, who has some mental health issues, and who is denied confidential 
access to potential counsel, can be said to have voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 
In State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991), this Court held that the 
determination whether a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel is "knowing and 
intelligent" should include an inquiry into the defendant's mental competence if the 
defendant's competence is questionable. As it was, the court's finding that Defendant 
had waived his right to counsel occurred just moments before a hearing on 
Defendant's competency in which two doctors rendered conflicting opinions. From 
the transcripts of that hearing (#32 of the statement of facts) at page 98, lines 12-20, 
the Defendant asked, "Dr. Giles, if I had hired an attorney, and that attorney took a 
large sum of money from me, put it in his bank account instead of opening a bank 
account for me, like he said, and then quit taking my phone calls and wouldn't come 
to see me at the jail, ...would it be reasonable for me after that time to have a 
heightened sense of precaution in hiring other counsel?" To which the doctor 
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answers, "Yes." Under these circumstances, the Defendant could rightly conclude 
that his efforts to first secure confidentiality and then come to a meeting of the minds 
with prospective counsel, was a reasonable precursor to retaining an attorney for such 
an important and high profile case. The inquiiy of November 13, 2006, into whether 
Defendant needed the court's assistance in getting access to attorneys in his efforts to 
appoint counsel resulted in the issuing of an order for twenty-five "unmonitored" 
phone calls to attorneys. (R. 2970/17-23) 
Further inquiry into Defendant's progress in that regard on December 4, 2006, 
resulted in a written court order for these same twenty-five phone calls. (See exhibit 
#61204 of Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment, R. 2774.) Defendant 
continued to advise the court of his problems relating to phone access to counsel; and 
at the hearing of December 20, 2006, the court advised the Defendant to "contact an 
attorney from the ACLU" in order to get access to a criminal attorney. Such 
directions are confusing in that they seem to suggest that Defendant hire an attorney to 
assist him in hiring an attorney. Additionally, these directives clearly demonstrate the 
necessity of the trial court to go to additional lengths to secure counsel for the 
Defendant. It seems incongruous for the trial court to have recognized the 
Defendant's plight and order unmonitored phone call, but to then refuse to enforce 
that order, and base as waiver of counsel on a Defendant's insistence that he have 
confidential communications with his counsel. 
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The case of State v. Pedockie, 2006 Ut. 28, 137 P.3d 716, 723-725 (Utah 2006), 
is directly on point regarding this issue. In that case the Supreme Court considered a 
similarly confusing situation in which it ruled, "First, we conclude that Pedockie did 
not voluntarily waive his right to counsel through his conduct. While the trial judge 
repeatedly chastised Pedockie for his past unwillingness to follow counsel's advice, 
his statements with respect to Pedockie's right to appointed counsel were inconsistent 
and confusing." Mat \ 50. Defendant contends the court should follow the axiom 
"we pause to note that, considering the strong presumption against waiver and the 
fundamental nature of the right to counsel, any doubts must be resolved in favor of the 
defendant." M At f45. 
Finally, the trial court erred in not at least appointing stand-by counsel. Even in 
Pedockie, "the trial judge agreed to appoint the public defender's office for the third 
time ... and later insisted that the PDA attorney's role was limited to that of stand-by 
counsel." For the trial court in the present case to require the defendant to proceed on 
a pro se basis, in light of the Pedockie decision is error. Clearly this error was 
significantly prejudicial to defendant. 
In United States v, Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006), the Court 
held, "Where the right to be assisted by counsel of one's choice is wrongly denied.. .it 
is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation. Deprivation of the right is "complete" when the defendant is 
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erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of 
the quality of the representation he received." 
Under the circumstances of the present case, the trial court clearly violated the 
defendant's constitutional right to counsel by prematurely declaring a waiver due to 
his rejection of a conflicted counsel, and then the knee-jerk rejection of counsel with 
whom the defendant had no opportunity to communicate or develop an appropriate 
attorney client relationship. This declaration of waiver is further called into question 
due to the known mental health issues specifically regarding the acceptance of 
counsel. It is instructive to note that after private and confidential meetings with 
appellate counsel, this same defendant has accepted appellate counsel appointment. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN 
JUDGE DAVIS SUMMARILY FOUND DEFENDANT IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR NOT APPEARING AT A COURT 
HEARING, SET A FIXED AND UNCONDITIONAL FINE 
AGAINST DEFENDANT TO BE PAID TO THE COURT, AND 
DENIED DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND 
AGAINST THE CONTEMPT CHARGE. 
In the case at bar, the trial court made a finding of criminal contempt for the 
defendant's failure to attend a court hearing. The defendant believes the trial court 
erred by the finding of criminal contempt and denying the defendant his due process 
rights of a hearing with notice, and an opportunity to defend against the charges. The 
defendant has, as the trial court well knew various possible defenses including an 
affirmative defenses of mental illness (U.C.A. §76-2-305) and ignorance of mistake of 
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I 
fact or law (U.C.A. §76-2-304). In the case of Van Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 
(Utah 1988), the Court noted in footnote 5, "After; this opinion had been prepared, the 
United States Supreme Court released its opinion in Hicks, ex. rel Feiock v. Feiock, 
485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 00 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988)," pointing out that "Feiock 
significantly alters the federal rule for determining whether a contempt order is civil 
or criminal in nature." In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988), the court 
set forth the rule for determining whether a contempt finding is criminal or civil 
stating, 
".. .we now.. .adopt the Feiock approach as a matter of state law. For 
all future cases, we will follow the rule that a contempt order is 
criminal if the fine or sentence imposed is fixed and unconditional but 
is civil if the fine or imprisonment is conditional such that the 
contemnor can obtain relief from the contempt order merely by doing 
some act as ordered by the court. (See Fn5) Further, a contempt order 
is civil if the order is to pay a fine to the other party rather than to the 
court. (See Hicks ex. Rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429-34 
(1988)) 
And, the court held, "As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to 
comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew 
what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do 
so" (Id. at 1172) . (See also Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1983); 
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977)). These three elements must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt proceeding, Gompers v. 
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 21 U.S. 418, 444, 31 S.Ct. 492, 499, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911), 
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and by clear and convincing evidence in a civil proceeding. Thomas v. Thomas, 569 
P.2datll21." 
Also, "The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause requires that one 
facing the possibility of a contempt order must be afforded certain minimal procedural 
protections. See Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982). 
Defendant contends that the alleged contempt was indirect as opposed to direct 
contempt, which can properly be adjudicated only in a proceeding more tightly 
hedged about with procedural protections. (See U.C.A. 1953 §78B-6-301(5) which 
provides, "(5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court") 
The due process provision of the federal constitution requires that in a prosecution for 
a contempt not committed in the presence of the court, the person charged be advised 
of the nature of the action against him [or her] have assistance of counsel, if 
requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and have the right to offer testimony 
on his [or her] behalf. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d at 1322, see U.S. Const. Amend. 
XIV; cf. Robinson v. City Court ex. rel City ofOgden, 185 P.2d, 256, 259 (Utah 9947) 
(applying Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7 & 12 to criminal contempt proceedings). These 
protections as applied to contempt proceedings are codified in Utah Code Ann. §78B-
6-309, which provides: 
When the person arrested has been brought up or has appeared, the 
court shall proceed to investigate the charge, and hear any answer 
which the person arrested may make. The court may examine 
witnesses for or against the person arrested, for which an adjournment 
may be had from time to time, if necessary. 
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Unfortunately, the procedural protections of the law were not followed. Judge 
Davis signed an ex parte order on August 21, 2006 (which was not sent to Defendant) 
making a summary finding of contempt and assigning another psychologist to 
examine Defendant in relation to competency (R. 1479). Defendant learned of the 
existence of the ex parte order after having argued a Motion to Amend or Alter a 
Judgment at the October 2, 2006, hearing. In an Order 17, 2006, letter to the clerk, 
Defendant requested a copy of that ex parte order and an audio copy of the October 2, 
2006, hearing (R. 2970/3-4). Consequently, the Defendant was denied an opportunity 
to assert the two affirmative defenses mentioned above. Further, Defendant was not 
advised of the legal rights which attach separate from the other proceedings in which 
Defendant was engaged. 
POINT III 
JUDGE LAYCOCK ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND MISAPPLIED A LEGAL PRECEPT IN 
HER ORDER OF NOVEMBER 13, 2006, WHICH UPHOLDS 
THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
The Defendant contends that in the proceeding surrounding the Motion to 
Amend or Alter a Judgment, Defendant's due process rights were denied and the 
requirements of the law for a finding of contempt were not met. Since the ex parte 
order of Judge Davis had not been served upon the Defendant nor had any affidavit 
been presented to the court reciting the facts constituting the contempt, Defendant was 
put in an impossible position, being unaware of the trial courts position that because 
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Defendant was present in court when the August 14, 2006 hearing was set, that 
Defendant must have known that the hearing was set for 8:30 a.m. and not 2:30 p.m. 
Such a conclusion is erroneous, and Defendant had some valid arguments that he was 
unable to present to the court. 
As argued against the summary finding of contempt by Judge Davis, the 
statutory and constitutional safeguards had not been afforded Defendant. However, 
Defendant also argues that Judge Laycock's findings do not meet the standard of law. 
As the court in Von Hake v. Thomas, supra, points out, "In order to prove contempt 
for failure to comply with a court order, it must be shown that the person cited for 
contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed 
or refused to do so." Id. At 1172. As Defendant testified to the court at the October 2, 
2006, hearing (R. 2969/11, lines 16-22), "I don't get the top copy. Mr. Probert has 
made a copy of the minute entry which showed 8:30. I got the third copy, and my 
third copy had the first part of the 8, which looked like a 2, and the second part of the 
8 did not show up. So when I looked at the minute entry it said that my - my court 
appearance was scheduled for 2:30. I responded as if it was 2:30;..." (and at R. 
2969/12, lines 11-16) "My argument, your honor, is that under the concept of 
culpability, I was acting on what I believed to be the correct time. If it hadn't been for 
th 
the experience on the 7 of August in which I was asked to appear at a time that was 
incorrect, then I may not have - may not have made this mistake on the 14th." 
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In Judge Laycock's oral ruling (R. 2969/31-32) she states, "As I look at this, it 
is possible to see that he might have assumed that it was a 2, but it also looks like an 
8....My assumption is that if the defendant is called down and is supposed to go to 
court, he'll respond and he'll go, whether or not he thinks the officers may or may not 
be right. There are times that we have people come over unnecessarily. We call it 
"field trips...My assumption is that the defendants will obey and come when they are 
asked to come by the jail personnel...for those reasons, I will not vacate the order 
from Judge Davis." 
If pretrial detainees are without the statutory right of notice of a hearing (or 
changes in scheduled hearings), then the judge may be correct. However, that is not 
the law. Defendant was, at the time of the allegation of contempt, pro se and of the 
mind that the statutes applied to him. Therefore, Defendant asserts that the judge's 
reasoning (when she concludes that pre-trial detainees are compelled to "come over 
unnecessarily") is, 1) unsupported by law, and 2) not a rule or order that Defendant 
knew about (thus, Defendant did not know "what was required" of him). 
Lastly, "In Jeffery v. Trouse, 50 P.2d. 872, 874 (Mont 1935), it is held that 
neither the trial court nor a jury may arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony 
of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to law, if such testimony does 
not exceed probability." (Cited mDinneen v. Finch, 603 P.2d 575, 582 (Idahol979). 
On December 4, 2006, Defendant stated for the record (R. 2972/5, line 22-24), 
"I have had no pencil or no way of making a note. So I have to kind of rely on my 
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memory and get back to my room and then make notes." As a pre-trial detainee 
unable to make notes at court, Defendant's testimony, "so when I looked at the minute 
entry it said that my - my court appearance was scheduled for 2:30. I responded as if 
it was 2:30," is unimpeached, and the judge's findings are erroneous. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FORMULATING OR 
APPLYING A LEGAL PRECEPT WHEN, IN ORDERING A 
REDIRECTION OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE MENTAL 
CONDITION OF THE DEFENDANT, THE JUDGE ORDERED 
THE PSYCHOLOGIST TO RE-INTERVIEW AND RE-
EVALUATE DEFENDANT TO ADDRESS THE CRITERIA 
"DID THE DEFENDANT, AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, 
SUFFER FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS, AS DEFINED U.C.A. 
§76-2-305(4)(A), THAT PREVENTED HIM FROM FORMING 
THE INTENT TO INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY OR 
RECKLESSLY COMMIT THE CRIMES WITH WHICH HE IS 
CHARGED 
The Defendant contends the wording of the Second Amended Order for 
Evaluation had the effect of nullifying Defendant's affirmative defense of mental 
illness such that it denied Defendant his due process rights under the statutory 
defense. On September 25, 2007, the court issued an order for evaluation, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-301. Defendant motioned the court for an amendment to the 
order, filed Septembers 28, 2007, and the court granted the motion adding to the 
orders directions to "examine the defendant and investigate his mental condition," the 
phrase "at the time of the offense." The court's amended order for evaluation was 
filed October 3. 2007. Dr. Wootton's report was filed on October 18, 2007, and on 
November 7, 2007, the state filed a Motion to Pve-Direct Evaluation of Defendant. A 
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copy was handed to Defendant at his court appearance that day and ruled upon by the 
judge without allowing defendant the statutory time to respond. The judge issued the 
Second Amended Order of Evaluation, filed the following day, directing the 
psychologists to answer the question, "Did the defendant, at the time of the offense, 
suffer from a mental illness as defined in U.C.A. §76-2-305(4)(a), that prevented him 
from forming the intent to intentionally, knowingly or recklessly commit the crimes 
with which he is charged?" The Defendant contends the court's Second Amended 
Order is in conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. Herrera, 895 
P.2d 359, 268 (Utah 1995) which states, "the mens rea model entitles a defendant to 
present evidence supporting his insanity claim but does not require the defendant to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his disease negates the requisite intent." The 
question posed to the psychologists allows them to testify by inference, to an ultimate 
issue in contradiction to Rule 704(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. It also imposes 
criteria stricter than the statute, which had the effect of confusing the issue and 
eliminating defendant's lawful affirmative defense. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE 
DISTRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT ACCESS TO THE 
PHOTO COMPUTER DISC WHICH HELD THE CRIME SCENE 
PHOTOS, WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS ACTING IN A PRO < 
SE CAPACITY, AND NEEDED ACCESS TO THESE 
DOCUMENTS TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL AND PRESENT A 
DEFENSE. 
i 
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On November 27, 2007, Defendant's Motion for Access to Disc Checked Into 
Evidence was filed with the court, and on December 28, 2007, the court filed 
Defendant's memorandum in support of the motion. (The Defendant includes in the 
addendum a copy of trial exhibit #16A and 16B as Addendum Gfor the court's 
convenience). Defendant points out that both photographs carry markings indicating 
they were both taken on the same day, within sixty seconds of each other. And those 
markings show a date but not a month. Lane Critser testified at trial that he was the 
person who took the photographs (R. 2980/65). Defendant contends that the vast 
difference in light is evidence that those photographs were taken on different days, 
months apart. And the disc itself contains evidence in digital form that is exculpatoiy 
to Defendant and needed for impeachment. Under United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, "When the state suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence, the good or bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant; a due process violation 
occurs whenever such evidence is withheld." Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 124 
S.Ct. 1200, 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004) (per curiam). See also State v. Gulbransen, 
2005 UT, 7, 106 P.3d 734, 742 (Utah 2005). 
On a similar vein, in Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 387-88 (3d Cir. 2004), 
that court held undisclosed police reports were material because they could be used to 
impeach the witness when trial testimony was inconsistent with the reports. The State 
knew that Defendant wanted a copy of the CD disc containing the crime scene photos 
but failed to make this discovery available to Defendant. The prosecutor's failure to 
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comply with basic discovery requests and the court's failure to enforce Defendant's 
requests is a violation of Defendant's due process rights and is reversible error. In 
Brady v. Maiyland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the supreme court held that due process 
requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
when such evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Under the due process clause 
of the state and federal constitutions, a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until 
the State has proven him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. "[A]s both a state and 
federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process requires that the 
prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191,195 (Utah 1999). See also, Utah Const. Art. I, §7; U.S. 
Const. Amend. V, XIV; State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992)("Both the 
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution require that the burden of 
proving all elements of a crime is on the prosecution.") 
Proving a defendant guilty of all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt must be proven by accurate and valid evidence. If in the present case Defendant 
requested the disc of crime scene photos because the photos may have been altered or 
were not accurate, failure of the State to provide Defendant with that information 
violates Defendant's due process rights as well as constitutes prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING TRIAL EXHIBIT 
#2, A UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE REPORT BEARING 
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ON EVENTS THAT OCCURRED AT THE TIME OF ARREST, 
AND TRIAL EXHIBIT #8, A UTAH STATE CRIME LAB 
REPORT INDICATING THAT UNDER VISUAL AND 
CHEMICAL TESTS THERE WAS NO BLOOD DETECTED ON 
THE KNIFE REPORTEDLY FOUND AT THE ARREST SCENE. 
The Defendant contends he was prejudiced by the exclusion of the trial exhibits 
#2 and #8. Rule 803(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part: 
Public Records and Reports [and makes admissible] "[r]ecords, 
reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices 
of agencies," and under subsection (c) such are admissible "against the 
government in criminal cases," allowing the admission of such things as 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the resources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trust worthiness. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Utah 
1983) has held, "whether police records are admissible depends on the nature of the 
records and the purpose for which they are offered." "After a careful and scholarly 
analysis of many cases... involving the admissibility of police records, United States v. 
Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975) set forth the rule, to which we adhere, that 
police reports of crimes should be admitted when offered by the defendant in a 
criminal case to support his defense. When offered by the prosecution, however, they 
should ordinarily be excluded." By its markings (and the fact it was given to 
Defendant as part of discovery), Exhibit #2 was admissible. 
Exhibit #8 is a State Crime Lab Report indicating there was no blood detected 
on the knife collected at the crime scene. This evidence would have worked together 
with photo enlargements (had Defendant acquired a copy of the CD disc containing 
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photos of the crime scene) to show that the angle of the injury to Office Horn was 
similar to the angle of a pen being slipped into a breast pocket (his injury was about 
the area of his right breast pocket). As such, this State Crime Lab Report had 
exculpatory and impeachment value to defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in Yacht 
Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm., 681 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 1984) held, "the 
state chemist is appointed by the Commissioner of the State Department of 
Agriculture (citing U.C.A. 1953 §4-2-9) and is the chief administrative officer of the 
Division of Laboratories (citing U.C.A. §4-2-10). As such, the state chemist is a 
public official for purposes of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Then stating, "The state 
chemist's toxicology report is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule..." 
These documents are authenticated under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 901. The 
ruling to exclude trial exhibit #2 and #8 was in error and prejudicial to Defendant in 
that the pro se Defendant was unable to advance to the jury his theory of the case. 
Certainly the lack of blood on the weapon alleged by the State to be the source of the 
aggravated assault is material to the defense in its exclusion highly prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The many obstacles created by the fact that Defendant was in the custody of the 
close associates of the reported victims have denied defendant the due process rights 
dictated by statute and constitution. The trial court erred in not enforcing those rights. 
For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse his 
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convictions. And further, requests this case be remanded to another county 
(Defendant suggests a northern county, away from any improper influence). 
DATED this J_ day of July 2010. 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Ryan 
Tenney, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid this 
_ J T _ day of July 2010. 
LNDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ¥ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
AMADOR SANTONIO, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Utah County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031402469 FS 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Date: March 25, 2009 
PRESENT 
Clerk: raelenec 
Prosecutor: KENNARD II, RANDY M 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 13, 1951 
Audio 
Tape Number: 09-201 18 Tape Count: 4.22 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty-Insanity - Disposition: 03/20/2008 Guilty 
2. DISARMING A PEACE OFFICER - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty-Insanity - Disposition: 03/20/2008 Guilty 
4. ASSAULT AGAINST POLICE OFFICER - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty-Insanity - Disposition: 03/20/2008 Guilty 
5. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty-Insanity - Disposition: 03/20/2008 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 09-201 18 COUNT: 4.22 
This matter comes before the Court for sentencing. The defendant 
appears in custody of the Utah County Sheriff. 
The Court addresses pending issues. The Court makes findings and 
notes the objection made by the defendant during Mr. Kennard's 
rebuttal argument at trial; the defendant may take all legal papers 
with him to another jail/prison. 
Mr. Kennard responds. The defendant addresses the Court regarding 
the PSI and the matrix. The Court addresses issues with the PSI 
and the matrix. The defendant responds as does Mr. Kennard. 
The Court addresses other PSI issues and all parties stipulate to 
changes made by the Court. 
The defendant addresses the Court regarding 402 motion. Mr. 
Kennard responds. The Court makes findings and denies the motion. 
The defendant addresses the Court regarding sentencing. Mr. 
Kennard addresses the Court regarding sentencing. The defendant 
responds. The Court proceeds with sentencing at this time. 
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Case No: 031402469 
Date: Mar 25, 2009 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISARMING A PEACE OFFICER a 
1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court orders counts 1, 3 and 4 to run concurrent with each 
other. The Court orders count 1 (aggravated assault) to run 
consecutive to count 2 (disarming a peace officer). 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends to the Board of Pardons that the defendant 
receive credit for 2103 days served. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
KENNETH AMADOR MORALES 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ASSAULT AGAINST POLICE 
OFFICER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 365 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST 
a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 
day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The Court will allow the defendant to serve the jail time at the 
Utah State Prison. The defendant is remanded into the custody of 
the Utah County Sheriff to be transported to the Utah State Prison 
to begin prison term. 
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Case No: 031402469 
Date: Mar 25, 2009 
SENTENCE 
Charge # 
FINE 
1 Fine: 
Suspended: 
Due: 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 4 
Charge # 5 
Fine : 
Suspended: 
Due : 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Due: 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Due: 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$5000.00 
$5000.00 
$0.00 
$10000.00 
$10000.00 
$0.00 
$2500.00 
$2500.00 
$0.00 
$1000 
$1000 
$0.00 
00 
00 
$18500 
$18500 
$0 
$0 
Plus Interest 
Date: ^ S WUACAL^W*! 
^a^if^^''' 
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§4-2-9. Appointment. 
The state chemist shall be appointed by the commissioner. 
§4-2-10. State chemist responsibilities. 
(1) The state chemist shall: 
(a) serve as the chief administrative officer of the Division of Laboratories; and 
(b) supervise and administer all analytical tests required to be performed under 
this title or under any rule authorized by it. 
(2) The state chemist may perform analytical tests for other state agencies, 
federal agencies, units of local government, and private persons if: 
(a) the tests and analytical work do not interfere with, or impede, the work 
required by the department; and 
(b) a charge commensurate with the work involved is made and collected. 
(3) The state chemist shall perform any other official duties assigned by the 
commissioner. 
§70A-2-204. Formation in general. 
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show 
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of 
such a contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even 
though the moment of its making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail 
for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
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§76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law, 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the 
culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is 
no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct 
did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of 
permission by an administrative agency charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of 
record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a 
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed. 
§76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influence of alcohol or other 
substance voluntarily consumed — Definition. 
(1) (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the 
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an 
element of the offense charged. 
(b) Mental illness is not otherwise a defense, but may be evidence in mitigation 
of the penalty in a capital felony under Section 76-3-207 and may be evidence of 
special mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or attempted criminal 
homicide offense under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as 
"insanity" and "diminished mental capacity." 
(3) A person who asserts a defense of insanity or diminished mental capacity, 
and who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or ingested 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged 
offense is not excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness if 
the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed to the 
mental illness. 
(4) (a) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect that substantially 
impairs a person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental defect 
may be a congenital condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical 
or mental disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental retardation. 
(b) "Mental illness" does not mean an abnormality manifested primarily by 
repeated criminal conduct. 
(5) "Mental retardation" means a significant subaverage general intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and 
manifested prior to age 22. 
§76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the 
crime; and 
(b) (i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an 
awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly 
corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to 
be. 
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§76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer or a military service member in 
uniform — Penalty. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Military service member in uniform" means: 
(i) a member of any branch of the United States military who is wearing a 
uniform as authorized by the member's branch of service; or 
(ii) a member of the National Guard serving as provided in Section 39-1-5 or 
39-1-9. 
(b) "Peace officer" means a law enforcement officer certified under Section 53-
13-103. 
(2) (a) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as provided in 
Subsection (2)(b), who: 
(i) assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer, and when 
the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer; or 
(ii) assaults a military service member in uniform when that service member is 
on orders and acting within the scope of authority granted to the military service 
member in uniform. 
(b) A person who violates this section and has been previously convicted of a 
violation of this section is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another correctional 
facility, a minimum of: 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(4) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required 
under Subsection (3) if the court finds that the interests of justice would be best 
served and makes specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the 
record. 
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(5) This section does not affect or limit any individual's constitutional right to 
the lawful expression of free speech, the right of assembly, or any other recognized 
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of Utah or by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States. 
§76-5-102.8. Disarming a peace officer. 
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally takes or removes, or 
attempts to take or remove a firearm from the person or immediate presence of a 
person he knows is a peace officer: 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer. 
§76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses 
a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely 
to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony 
§77-16a-301. Mental examination of defendant 
(1) (a) When the court receives notice that a defendant intends to claim that the 
defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity or that the defendant had diminished 
mental capacity, or that the defendant intends to assert special mitigation under 
Subsection 76-5-205.5(1 )(a), the court shall order the Department of Human 
Services to examine the defendant and investigate the defendant's mental 
condition. 
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(b) The person or organization directed by the department to conduct the 
examination shall testify at the request of the court or either party in any 
proceeding in which the testimony is otherwise admissible. 
(c) Pending trial, unless the court or the executive director directs otherwise, the 
defendant shall be retained in the same custody or status the defendant was in at 
the time the examination was ordered. 
(2) (a) The defendant shall be available and shall fully cooperate in the 
examination by the department and any other independent examiners for the 
defense and the prosecuting attorney. 
(b) If the defendant fails to be available and to fully cooperate, and that failure 
is established to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial, the 
defendant is barred from presenting expert testimony relating to the defendant's 
defense of mental illness at the trial of the case. 
(c) The department shall complete the examination within 30 days after the 
court's order, and shall prepare and provide to the court prosecutor and defense 
counsel a written report concerning the condition of the defendant. 
(3) Within 10 days after receipt of the report from the department, but not later 
than five days before the trial of the case, or at any other time the court directs, the 
prosecuting attorney shall file and serve upon the defendant a notice of rebuttal of 
the defense of mental illness, which shall contain the names of witnesses the 
prosecuting attorney proposes to call in rebuttal. 
(4) The reports of any other independent examiner are admissible as evidence 
upon stipulation of the prosecution and defense. 
(5) This section does not prevent any party from producing any other testimony 
as to the mental condition of the defendant. Expert witnesses who are not 
appointed by the court are not entitled to compensation under Subsection (7). 
(6) This section does not require the admission of evidence not otherwise 
admissible. 
(7) Expenses of examination ordered by the court under this section shall be 
paid by the Department of Human Services. Travel expenses associated with the 
examination incurred by the defendant shall be charged by the department to the 
county where prosecution is commenced. Examination of defendants charged with 
violation of municipal or county ordinances shall be charged by the department to 
the entity commencing the prosecution. 
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§76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any 
act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
§78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
§78B-6-301. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its proceedings are 
contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while 
holding the court, tending to interrupt the course of a trial or other judicial 
proceeding; 
(2) breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to 
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding; 
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(3) misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an 
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a 
judicial or ministerial service; 
(4) deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an 
action or special proceeding; 
(5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court; 
(6) acting as an officer, attorney or counselor, of a court without authority; 
(7) rescuing any person or property that is in the custody of an officer by virtue 
of an order or process of the court; 
(8) unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, 
remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the calendar for 
trial; 
(9) any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court; 
(10) disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or to 
answer as a witness; 
(11) when summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve, or 
improperly conversing with a party to an action to be tried at the court, or with any 
other person, concerning the merits of an action, or receiving a communication 
from a party or other person in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the 
communication to the court; and 
(12) disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the lawful 
judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an action or special 
proceeding contrary to law, after the action or special proceeding is removed from 
the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the 
lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of 
the officer. 
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Rule 504. Lawyer-client. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, association, 
or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered 
professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view 
to obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to 
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a 
rendition of professional legal services. 
[4] A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain 
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on 
behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the 
lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the course of 
representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and the client's 
representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the 
professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third 
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition 
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and 
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, 
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of 
common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's 
representatives and lawyers representing others in matters of common 
interest, in any combination. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege? The privilege may be claimed by the client, 
the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased 
client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, 
association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person 
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who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to have 
authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or 
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client 
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant 
to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, 
regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by 
inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an 
issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the 
lawyer; or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue 
concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or 
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common 
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any 
of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an 
action between any of the clients. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 504 is based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United States Supreme 
Court. Rule 504 would replace and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) 
and is intended to be consistent with the ethical obligations of confidentiality 
set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Committee revised the proposed rule of the United States Supreme Court 
to address the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,101 S. 
Ct. 677 (1981), as to when communications involving representatives of a 
corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected limiting 
the privilege to members of the "control group" and added as subparagraph 
(a)(4) a definition for "representative of the client" that includes within the 
privilege disclosures not only of the client and the client's formal 
spokesperson, but also employees who are specifically authorized to 
communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word "specifically" 
is intended to preclude a general authorization from the client for the client's 
employees to communicate under the cloak of the privilege, but is intended to 
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allow the client, as related to a specific matter, to authorize the client's 
employees as "representatives" to disclose information to the lawyer as to 
that specific matter with confidence that the disclosures will remain within 
the lawyer-client privilege. 
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be directly paid by the lawyer as 
long as the representative meets the requirement of being engaged to assist 
the lawyer in providing legal services. Thus, a person paid directly by the 
client but working under the control and direction of the lawyer for the 
purposes of providing legal services satisfies the requirements of 
subparagraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of the client who may be an 
independent contractor, such as an independent accountant, consultant or 
person providing other services, is a representative of the client for purposes 
of subparagraph (a)(5) if such person has been engaged to provide services 
reasonably related to the subject matter of the legal services or whose service 
is necessary to provide such service. 
The client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential 
communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the lawyer or others who 
were involved in the conference or learned, without the knowledge of the 
client, the content of the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are 
dealt with by Rule 507. 
Under subparagraph (b) communications among the various people involved 
in the legal matter, relating to the providing of legal services, are all privileged, 
except for communications between clients. Those are privileged only if they 
are part of a conference with others involved in legal services. 
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor, trustee, or similar representative of a 
corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence" to 
claim the privilege. Where there is a dispute as to which of several persons 
has claims to the rights of a previously existing entity, the court will be 
required to determine from the facts which entity's claim is most consistent 
with the purposes of this rule. 
The Committee considered and rejected an exception to the rule for 
communications in furtherance of a tort. Disallowing the privilege where the 
lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud is consistent 
with the trend in other states. The Committee considered extending the 
exception to include "intentional torts," but concluded that because of the 
broad range of conduct that may be found to be an intentional tort, such an 
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exception would create undesirable ambiguities and uncertainties as to when 
the privilege applies. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically 
enumerated; and further endorsed the concept that in the area of exceptions, 
the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing 
the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to 
avoid any possible clashes with the common law concepts of "waiver." 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a 
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the 
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element 
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for 
the trier of fact alone. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but 
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not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of 
declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past 
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of 
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about 
which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to 
enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or 
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to 
reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be 
read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an 
adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it 
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or 
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The 
term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, 
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions 
of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the 
matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation 
was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, 
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the 
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to 
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which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases 
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in 
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual 
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, 
fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office 
pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence 
of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, 
was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the 
form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent 
search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, 
deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar 
facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a 
religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a 
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered 
a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by 
the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act 
certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a 
reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history 
contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions 
on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the 
content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each 
person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a 
public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of 
that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement 
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if 
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the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with 
the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of 
the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence 
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, 
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the 
public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness 
upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, 
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject 
of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by 
the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by 
judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not 
be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members 
of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's 
associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, 
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, 
or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a 
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting 
lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history important to 
the community or State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among 
associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a 
trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a 
person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one 
year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when 
offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than 
impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of 
an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments 
as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential 
to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
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RULE 901. REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION OR 
IDENTIFICATION 
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the 
requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is 
claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of 
handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or by 
expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or 
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon 
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged 
speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a call was 
made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular 
person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, including self-
identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of 
a business, the call was made to a place of business and the conversation related to 
business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be 
recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported 
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public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the 
public office where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or data 
compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion 
concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely 
be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a 
result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or 
identification provided by court rule or statute of this state. 
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ADDENDUM D 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING TRIAL EXHIBIT 
#28, A CERTIFIED COPY OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
RELATING TO AN ADJUDICATION OF A MENTAL 
DISEASE OR DEFECT OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT HAD PREVIOUSLY TAKEN 
JUDICIAL NOTE OF DURING THE PROCEEDING OF THE 
CASE, WHEN IT HAD BEEN OFFERED BY THE STATE; 
AND TRIAL EXHIBIT #29, A MEMORANDUM DECISIONS 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY IN WHICH 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD MADE A FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT CONTINUED TO SUFFER 
FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS. 
The Defendant attempted to admit into trial exhibits #28 and #29 which 
both bear of the Defendant's mental condition and support the affirmative defense 
associated therewith. 
By way of history, on October 30, 2003, the state filed certified copy of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on Defendant's competency in case no. 
2:00 CR 90-C, United States District Court moving the court to take judicial notice 
of those findings of the District Court of Utah from the year 2000. The trial court 
granted that motion and that document then became a record of a proceeding in the 
case before the trial court. Defendant prevailed on that competency challenge. 
However, Dr. Panos opined a mental illness consistent with the findings of the 
federal court (although not so as to affect competency). Defendant's competency 
1 
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was again challenged and trial exhibit #29 is the Memorandum Decision Re: 
Defendant's Competency, a finding by Judge Lay cock that despite being 
competent, the Defendant nonetheless suffered from a mental illness. 
In State v. Shreve, 514 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1973), the court held, "It seems 
to be the law that a court will take judicial knowledge of its own records insofar as 
those are a part of the matter before the court." And also, in Richie v. Richie, 784 
P.2d 465, 468 (1989), the court held, "Courts may take judicial notice of the 
records and prior proceedings in the same case." These same authorities were 
cited to the court by the state to support the state's motion to take judicial notice of 
the record, filed 2-20-2007. And while the same judge granted the state's motion, 
she denied an identical motion by the Defendant. Defendant contends this 
demonstrates bias and partiality. The exclusion of lawfully appropriate evidence in 
the presentation of facts in support of an affirmative defense was prejudicial to 
Defendant, and he was hamied in that the jury found him not to be suffering from a 
mental illness. Defendant was not afforded a fair trial. The conviction should be 
vacated. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION #14.2 REGARDING THE 
STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "ATTEMPT" AS STATED IN 
U.C.A. §76-4-101. 
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At the outset, it is important to remember that the Defendant was acting in a 
pro se capacity, without legal training. The Defendant, without even the benefit of 
standby counsel, was required to attempt a felony jury trial with no prior 
experience. Given that parameter, prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion for 
proposed jury instructions which included an instruction on the specific elements 
of "attempt" contained in U.C.A. 1953 §76-4-101. The trial judge has expressed 
the belief that no such proposed instruction was submitted, thus denying 
Defendant's motion for arrest of judgment. 
On December 7, 2007, Defendant's Motion for Picture of the Holster was 
filed with the court (see docket page 83). Mailed to the court along with that 
motion was two additional proposed jury instructions (14.1 and 14.2) an affidavit 
and a notice (Defendant includes a copy of the proposed instruction and the 
certificate of mailing in Addendum K). Whether the clerk brought this to the 
attention of the judge is unknown to Defendant; however, it was submitted. In 
State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of Utah noted that, 
"the court failed to instruct the jury on the specific elements of attempt contained 
in U.C.A. 1953, §76-4-101. Specifically, the court failed to instruct that in order to 
convict of attempted robbery the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Defendant's conduct constituted a 'substantial step' toward commission of the 
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offense and that the substantial step must be 'strongly corroborative' of the 
Defendant's intent to commit the offense." 
In a like manner, the trial court's oversight affects the alleged charges of 
Assault Against a Peace Officer, Aggravated Assault, and Disarming a Peace 
Officer. Jury Instruction No. 7, instructed the jury that it must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant "[cjommitted an assault" as an element of 
aggravated assault. Jury Instruction No. 8, instructed the jury that it must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did "[t]ake or remove, or attempt to take 
or remove, a firearm" as an element of disarming a peace officer. Jury Instruction 
No. 9, instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant "[d]id assault a peace officer" as an element of assault against a peace 
officer. Assault was defined in Jury Instruction No. 12 (and is in accordance with 
U.C.A. § 76-5-102), and included the phrase, "an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another". 
Since, despite the Defendant's request, the definition of attempt was not 
included in the jury instructions, the jury was not instructed that in order to convict 
Defendant of the alleged charges which include attempt as an element, the jury 
must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant's conduct constituted a 
'substantial step' toward commission of the offense and that the substantial step 
must be 'strongly corroborative' of the Defendant's intent to commit the offense. 
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In the testimony of Raymond Edwards day one of the trial (March 17, 
2008) p.m. session he states (See Addendum E, R. 2977/29). 
Under these circumstances, all three of these charges are affected by this 
omission because the jury lacked an instruction on the element of attempt. It is 
possible that the jury could have believed that if Defendant had, at one point, 
dropped a knife, it could have come about as by an attempt to cause injury by use 
of force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. Likewise the jury could 
have concluded that if Defendant was resisting arrest, such resisting was an attempt 
to cause bodily injury which would satisfy the instruction regarding assault of a 
peace officer. The testimony of Raymond Edwards clearly never indicated 
anything other than an attempt to disarm a peace officer. But that alleged attempt 
was not measured against the legal definition. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 
1991), enumerated, "In a civil case, we will affirm a general verdict so long as 
there is one legally valid theory among those upon which the case went to the jury 
and sufficient evidence to support a verdict on that theory, (citations omitted) 
However, in a criminal case the rule is to the contrary. A majority of this court has 
stated that a jury must be unanimous on all elements of a criminal charge for the 
conviction to stand, (citation omitted) From this premise, it follows that a general 
verdict of guilty cannot stand if the State's case was based on more than one 
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factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and any one of those theories is 
flawed or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In such circumstances, it is 
impossible to determine whether the jury agreed unanimously on all of the 
elements of a valid evidentially supported theory of the elements of the crime." 
Further, in State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991), the Court held, 
"The jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements that it must find 
to convict of the crime charged, and the absence of such an instruction is reversible 
error as a matter of law." And concluding, "The failure to give this instruction can 
never be harmless error." 
In the state's response to the Motion for Arrest of Judgment, it is suggested 
that because the Defendant was not charged with an inchoate offense, the legal 
definition contained in U.C.A. §76-4-101 is not necessarily an element of the crime 
of which he was convicted. In the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in State v. 
Harmon, supra, the court's findings were in consideration of the very similar 
offense of "Attempted Robbery", another non-inchoate offense. Both offenses can 
be considered complete upon an "attempt". 
Since these two charges are characteristically so similar, the Utah Supreme 
Court could not have meant that Harmon must have the benefit of the attempt 
instruction but Santonio should not. Defendant urges the court to rule in line with 
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State v Jones, supra, that "the absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a 
matter of law." 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
The judge abused her discretion in not granting Defendant's Motion for 
Arrest of Judgment. "Judicial discretion, as used in the statute, means the option 
which a judge may exercise either to do or not to do that which is proposed to him 
that he shall do; it is the right to choose between the doing and not doing of a thing, 
the doing of which cannot be demanded as an absolute right of the party asking it 
to be done; it is the exercise of the right legally to determine between two or more 
course of action." State ex. rel Bethke v. Bain, 240 P.2d 958, 964 (Or 1952). 
However, in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), the court held 
"Vertical stare decisis compels court to follow strictly decisions rendered by higher 
court..." And again, referring to Bethke v. Baine, supra, at 965, ".. .where the facts 
are not in dispute, and there exists a strict rule of law that is applicable, no question 
of 'judicial discretion' arises. The trial judge is under the positive duty of correctly 
applying the law." 
Defendant argues that whatever the source of the omission of the jury 
instruction on "attempt," the trial judge is under the positive duty to issue and 
arrest of judgment. 
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Likewise, Exhibit C of Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment (jail 
policy #506(3)(b)) clearly states, "Attorneys will not be allowed contact visits 
unless pre-approved by the jail commander." And Exhibit #71025 establishes as 
fact that (1) an attorney came to visit with Defendant on 10-22-2007; (2) the 
attorney was denied a contact visit for confidentiality; and (3) Defendant had 
exhausted a grievance about this policy in or about April 2006. 
Defendant had also advised Judge Laycock that he has experienced mail 
interference at the jail (R. 2969/4, lines 5-7); had gathered evidence of attorney 
calls being monitored at the jail (R. 2970/20, lines 15-25); and that an attorney he 
had been talking to had been dissuaded from accepting employment by somebody 
from Utah County (R. 2971/6, lines 25/7, line 25). 
In Dinneen v. Finch, 603 P.2d 575, 582 (1979), it states, "The rule 
applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an action, 
is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, un-
contradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently 
improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or 
trial." There was no testimony in contradiction, but grievances and policy 
submitted to the court do support the truth of these facts and thereby a factual 
foundation which requires the judge to follow the dicta of Untied States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, and make a finding that Defendant was denied a fair 
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opportunity to engage in the process of selection of counsel, and was by such 
denied choice of counsel. What must follow is an arrest of judgment as a matter of 
law. 
POINT X 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
VIOLATED BY THE NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT 
OCCURRED AT TRIAL. 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, this court should reverse the 
Defendant's conviction. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse 
only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence... that 
a fair trial was had." State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 186 (Utah 2000). The errors 
in Defendant's trial, along with pre-trial issues, were too numerous to brief in the 
space allotted. Individually or cumulatively, the errors constitute prejudice and 
such undermines the reliability of the verdict. They act together with convincing 
force to establish two legal realities: (1) Defendant was not afforded the due 
process guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, such that a fair 
trial was not had; and (2) upon reversal of the conviction, a remand to a different 
county would be appropriate (Defendant opposing a remand to Salt Lake County). 
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ADDENDUM E 
R. 2961/7-22 
Santonio: I am accused of crimes, I am currently facing those charges, and I'm 
looking for access [to the law library] so I can prepare my defenses. 
Their policy says, .. .he's representing himself in a criminal matter and 
he should have access to the law library. That's their policy. I'm just 
asking for them to follow it. The issue is time. They've given me 
three hours and 20 minutes, approximately, in a year and two months. 
(R. 2961/58) 
Santonio: Your Honor, in three hours and 20 minutes, I have learned the 
definition of reasonable likelihood. In your own law library there's a 
little blue book on evidence and in there it says that most of the law of 
evidence is in the case law. (R. 2961/64) 
Santonio: Defendant's problem in the present case is that even then the sheriffs 
department has been ordered, was ordered by the court to transport the 
defendant to a law library, the jail was three times in contempt of this 
court, and even this court was without recourse to enforce their own 
order because the agency in contempt is the agency that is the 
enforcement arm of the court. (R. 2961/77) 
Court: It appears to me that in large measure the defendant is attempting to 
have this court micro manage the ministerial policy of the Utah County 
Jail and to bring civil rights claims within the context of a criminal 
case, to make a record in connection with that. 
In addition, in his own words, he seeks declaratory relief. This is not 
the proper court to seek declaratory relief for clarification as it relates 
to rules and regulations of the Utah County Jail. (R. 2961/ 78) 
Court: ...this court at this stage declines the invitation to micro manage the 
ministerial policies of the Utah County Jail, all their rules and 
regulations, and address the constitutionality of each and every policy 
and whether or not each and every one of those policies serves as a 
legitimate penological, serves a legitimate penological purpose. If this 
case, if this case were to accept that invitation then all criminal cases 
get mired completely down almost inextricably into civil rights 
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declaratory relief clarification cases involving rules and regulations 
and penological purposes. That's not the purpose of this court. There 
are other settings and other forums where each and every one of those 
issues can be dealt with appropriately. (R. 2961/98) 
Court: And he has separate sanctions, he's got civil rights sanctions. He can 
bring them in federal court, however he wish, wishes. (R. 2961/93) 
Court: And if he has civil rights actions that he believes are ripe, then he can 
file those. 
R. 2970/17-23 
Court: .. .let me correct one thing that you said, Mr. Santonio. As to the earlier 
reports that found you competent, I didn't make a finding that they were 
res judicata as to anything. 
Don't mistake res judicata. You don't understand that meaning of the 
term, just as you still don't understand the Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply here. 
There is a difference between the federal court and the state court. You 
don't understand that. You think you do but you do not. 
The only question for you as far as this hearing is concerned, Mr. 
Santonio, is whether you're going to represent yourself - get an 
attorney to represent you. 
Court: I have a question for you. As this point it's been some time since 
you've had the freedom of telephone to try and make arrangements to 
get counsel. Do you need some additional phone calls in order to 
obtain counsel in this matter? 
Santonio: Yes, your honor, I do. 
Court: How many do you need? 
Santonio: How would I know that? 
Court: Well, I'm not going to give you unlimited numbers. So you suggest a 
number of telephone calls that it would take you to obtain counsel, if 
that's what you want to do. 
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Santonio: I do. 
Court: Okay, how many do you need? 
Santonio: I think I need to explain something to the court, if the court is willing to 
listen. 
Court: I'll give you 60 seconds. 
Santonio: Thank you. 
Court: What do I need to know? 
Santonio: Your honor, when I made phone calls at the jail, they have been 
monitored by I believe it's ... Lieutenant Carter. Lieutenant Carter has 
sent word down in the middle of one conversation, which is nested in 
some of my documents the account of that, and from that I have reason 
to believe or reason to know that Lieutenant Carter listens in when I call 
these attorneys. I also have reason to know that Lieutenant Carter calls 
the FBI on the other line and has them also listen in, because an FBI 
agent called an attorney I was talking to while I was on the phone with 
him... 
Santonio: I have to believe that since there was federal charges which stem from 
the FBI, and because I've made complaints about treatment at the jail, 
and that an agent was sent from Ogden because of a conflict of interest 
in Salt Lake, and a conflict of interest in Provo...that the FBI is 
interfering with my ability to hire - hire counsel. They are talking to 
my counsel. I could know that-
Court: Mr. Probert, is there any reason - that he cannot have - telephone calls 
that are unmonitored so that if the jail places them for him to an 
attorney? 
Probert: The state does not object to him having unmonitored calls to his 
attorney. 
Court: All right, I'll make an order that you may have 25 unmonitored calls to 
attorneys' offices. Those will be unmonitored calls. 
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R. 2971/4-9 
The Court: What I need to know is how is it going, are you getting any - are you 
making any progress with the 25 telephone calls that I gave you, and 
progress getting counsel onboard to help you? 
Santonio: Your honor, this is the first time I've been - had an order from the 
court for unmonitored phone calls. My phone calls and meetings with 
attorneys for the last three and a half years have been monitored. 
What I have here is a motion to compel the jail because they refused 
to give me unmonitored phone calls. They have monitored them, and 
I have detailed that in great detail. 
My first opportunity to make a phone call was on the 30 , and that 
was delayed until 4 o'clock at night. My second opportunity was on 
the 1st of December. Of course, I've outlined those in great detail; and 
I have a copy here for the prosecutor and for the court. 
Court: I can't help but notice your first effort to get a phone call going was a 
week after the hearing (at line 18). 
Santonio: As I outlined in No. 2, your honor, I believe that I heard you say that 
you were going to prepare a written order. I had no pencil or no way 
of making a note. So I have to kind of rely on my memory and get 
back to my room and then make notes. 
Court: .. .when was the last time you tried to get counsel on board? 
Santonio: Your honor, I spent a great deal of time [p.7, line 1] courting counsel 
by mail, because I didn't have confidential communications on the 
phone nor in person. The jail says that they are discretionary. I 
would have to fight it in federal court. 
Court: Okay, so - when was the last time before now you made an effort to 
get - an effort to get someone on board? 
Santonio: I spent a great deal of time in the latter part of 2005 and the beginning 
of 2006 speaking with attorneys. The Utah County Attorney's Office 
then made an attempt - or an offer to hire counsel. This is a very long 
and fact sensitive story of how this came about. I tried to obtain 
counsel. Somebody in Utah County talked to my counsel and 
dissuaded him from accepting employment. My first conversations 
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with him were "Call me anytime." I was getting money transferred 
over from my bank to make that hire. 
Somebody talked to him and told him that I was not going to be 
available to hire him because I was going to the state hospital (line 
23). 
There's no way for me - to get to the state hospital unless Mr. Probert 
first of all withholds from me critical evidence, and that's the stuff he 
gave to the psychologist (p. 8, line 8). 
Okay, ... you're leaving the scene here. I want you to stick with the 
topic at hand. 
And those efforts came up until the point where Judge Davis said, "I 
think what we can do is reduce his bail to an O.R. and then release 
him and then he can go and find counsel." That, to me, made me 
believe that if I completed this competency thing and got - I believe 
competency vacates bail, for some reason. I don't totally understand 
it but you can -
No. (p.9, line 1) 
—well, my understanding was that you cannot bail out during a 
competency evaluation. That it is - vacated or - and somehow - so I 
have been seeking, first of all, to obtain that second ruling of 
competency, which is consistent with the other ruling in February 25th 
of 2004; and I have run at the obstacles that are called. They won't 
tell me what information Mr. Probert is giving them. So I don't have 
an adequate opportunity to present my defenses to whatever his 
accusations are. 
R. 2972/2-12 
The Court: ...I have received from Mr. Santonio — a motion to continue — Mr. 
Probert had indicated to my clerk that he had no opposition to it. Sir, 
I will grant that motion to continue (T. 12/20/06, p.2 line 13). 
Santonio: ...I have some documents; an affidavit, some motions and a 
memorandum to submit to the court (p.3, line 2). 
Santonio: 
Santonio: 
Court: 
Santonio: 
Court: 
Santonio: 
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Court: I'm going to take a recess. I'll read them. I'll be back in (p.4, line 
13). 
Santonio: Well, your honor, Fve had a lot of resistance at the jail. [p.5, line 1] 
I don't think that I'm going to get access to an attorney at that jail. 
They have three times sent someone [p.6, line 1] from the civil 
division of the Utah County Attorney to oppose my motions for 
contact attorney visits. Even if I hire an attorney, I can't talk to them 
confidentially (at line 14). 
Probert: Your honor, the state doubts the good faith in Mr. Santonio's 
representation about trying to obtain counsel (at line 16). 
Court: As to your complaint about the jail. Mr. Santonio, what you want me 
to do is micro-manage the jail. As Fve told probably hundreds of 
defendants before you, I do not micro-manage the jail. I do not 
micro-manage the jail. I do not manage the jail. I suggest that if you 
think you need help in dealing with them and your grievances with the 
jail, you contact an attorney from the ACLU. I can't help you there. 
I will not go in and tell them how to run their shop. That's not my 
job. (p. 10, line 15) 
Court: Now, as to your efforts to contact an attorney, I can't control what's 
happening to the phones at the Utah County Jail. (p. 12, line 9) 
R. 2973/646 
Court: All right, Mr. Santonio, you have filed a few things today that I don't 
have time to read, that Fm not going to read, I'm not going to consider. 
You have filed a motion to vacate this hearing. I'll give you a few 
minutes to address that. Go ahead, (p.6/19) 
Santonio: .. .the documents that I've delivered today were ones that I promised in 
the - in the filing that you just mentioned. I said I would give you a full 
report, and this is the full report. It takes me quite a while to do these, 
because I have to handwrite them, and some of the copies are 
handwritten; ... (p.7/2) 
... what I'm reporting to the court through the submissions is the 
barriers that have been erected to my access to attorneys at the jail. 
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Even if I can talk to an attorney, I don't get to talk to them 
confidentially. I get to talk to them through a monitored system of 
some kind. I do not get contact attorney visits with attorneys. I have 
approached the court on I believe on three or four different occasions, 
making a motion for the court ordered contact visits to allow for 
confidentiality, and those have been denied. 
I reported the issues of mail interference where I cite to the court 
ancillary facts, which I use those fact and apply the reasonable care 
standard to determine what would be appropriate response to that -
those facts, and how I would protect that confidentiality. 
All of these issues, I believe, lead me to conclude that I've been denied 
access to the process of selection of counsel, which I report today in 
these - in these submissions to the court; (p.8/1) 
Time does not make a difference. If I sit there for a long time and still 
don't have access to confer with attorneys confidentially, I have no way 
to assess their expertise or their vigilance in representing clients; and in 
no way can I make a reasonable choice, given those circumstances. 
Court: As I've explained to the defendant before, it is not my job, and I do not 
assume the responsibility to micro-manage the jail (p. 10/25 - p. 11/2). 
Court: For a variety of reasons, he wants me to believe that he has been 
precluded from obtaining his own counsel. My experience in 21 years, 
going on 22 years in this system in this county is that there are 
thousands of other prisoners who have been held at the jail before trial 
who have been able to obtain one, obtain counsel and two, meet with 
their counsel to prepare for trial. So I find his arguments and his 
reasons underlying those arguments without any value or validity 
(p.l 1/21-25 -p.12/1-3). 
Court: He has rejected appointed female counsel. He has rejected appointed 
male counsel, (p.12/11) 
Court: The defendant has not made a true waiver...He wants to have an 
attorney. So I find that there is no true waiver in this case (p. 13/19-21). 
Court: ...I'm going to find that he hasn't forfeited his right to counsel...(p. 
14/5-6; 8-13 and 23-24) 
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The third alternative under State v. Houston is waiver by conduct. 
Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his right to an 
attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may 
be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se, and thus as a 
.. .waiver of the right to counsel. I believe that we are there in this case 
(line 8). 
I now find that he has waived the right to counsel and will proceed pro 
se (line 23). 
There's a problem there, because the Frampton colloquy...it's based on 
the assumption that you are working as.. .a trial judge with a defendant 
who wants to represent himself; and we are in the reverse of that, 
(p. 15/2-7) 
...and I will find that you want to have an attorney, but you have 
waived that right through your dilatory tactics, (lines 15-17) 
He has filed other cases with a relationship to these cases in the federal 
court. Just this week I was served - well, I received through the mail 
his invitation to waive service in a federal case. Actually it was last 
week, and that has been referred to the attorney who represents the trial 
court judges in this state, (p. 16/9-14) 
And during the competency hearing that followed, the transcripts reflect the 
following: 
Dr. Mejia:I have a faculty appointment at the University of Utah and at Brigham 
Young University, (p.33/18-19) 
(inaudible) at both University of Utah and BYU as a managing faculty 
member (p.34/3-4). 
I found him incompetent in point No. IV, which is the ability to engage 
in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, (p.40/16-18) 
.. .1 indicate that in my opinion, Mr. Santonio has a mental disorder and 
that it impacts its ability in two areas. One of them being to engage in 
reasoned choice of legal strategies, and the other one, his ability to 
factually and rationally interact with defense counsel, (p.41/6-11) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court: Dr. Mejia, as far as your findings that he doesn't have the capacity to 
engage in reasoned choices of legal options and consequences, how do I 
view that in the fact I have a defendant that has filed reams and reams 
of paper with the court, in which he argues for himself and on his behalf 
on practically a daily basis? (p.44/4-21) 
Dr. Mejia: - in my opinion the defendant suffers from psychotic disorder, which 
renders him incompetent in a number of specific areas, but not 
necessarily across the board. 
So he may have sufficient intelligence and sufficient time and 
familiarity with legal issues to be able to do what he does, but his 
psychotic disorder involves paranoia and grandiosity and narcissism. 
Court: Would you give me more information about psychotic disorder? I think 
you said it was psychotic disorder NOS, which I understand to mean 
"not otherwise specified." (p.45/7-11 and 13-17) 
Tell me about what that means. 
Dr. Mejia: ...psychotic disorder has several characteristics. Paranoia is one of 
them that I already mentioned in this case. Not good reality contact or 
testing is another one. Hallucinations is another common symptom. 
Delusions is another characteristic sign of this disorder. 
Court: And just for the purpose of this hearing, where you talk specifically 
about paranoia and grandiosity, would you explain in layman's terms 
what you mean by that? (p.52/2-4 and 8-17) 
Dr. Mejia: ...paranoia is an iiTational expectation of harm, which is different from 
a rational expectation of harm, like being obviously if you're in an 
adversarial proceeding, you have to be careful with...somebody that's 
on the other side. When that crosses into irrationality, which I believe it 
is, and you believe - you expect harm from people that might even be 
trying to help you, or people that are simply doing their jobs and their 
functions, and you still take it as a personal attack on you, then it's 
paranoia. 
Grandiosity means that you feel that your attributes and your qualities 
are a lot - far superior than anybody else's. So for example, in this 
case, for him to find an attorney that he believes will appropriately 
represent him - I don't think that he will find an attorney that he 
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believes will have sufficient attributes that even come close to his own. 
So it's an over-inflated sense of ego or sense of self, is what it is. 
Probert: You've described grandiosity. Would that manifest itself in a difficulty 
with showing appropriate respect for the court that would be accorded 
tothecourt?(p.54/2-17) 
Dr. Mejia: Yes. 
Probert: perhaps an inability to comply with court's rules? 
Dr. Mejia: Yes. 
Probert: Would the problem that you see with this —...would that be likely to 
lead him down perhaps irrelevant paths of interest? 
Dr. Mejia: If I understand your question correctly - like I said before, I'm not an 
attorney. Maybe this strategy is a good one. I wouldn't know. The 
opinion that I'm rendering is that it seems to me that the underlying 
cause for the strategy that he's pursuing is due to psychotic symptoms. 
If it coincide with good legal strategy, so be it; but it just doesn't seem 
to be that it is. 
Santonio: Dr. Mejia, did you say that you were on the faulty of BYU? (p.55/11 
and 19) 
Dr. Mejia: At BYU at one point I also had an active status as a faculty member. 
Santonio: When was the last time that you were a faculty member at either of 
these universities? (p.56/22-25) 
Dr. Mejia: Probably three years for BYU - three to five years BYU. 
Probert: ...What is the connection between psychology and the definition of 
mental illness in U.C.A. 76-2-305 that led you to consider if Mr. 
Santonio has a mental illness? (p.66/22-25) 
Dr. Giles: ...At the training a few years ago, Judge Laycock was there and gave 
some input in terms of how she likes our orders - or the evaluations 
organized. So taking all those things in consideration, we tiy to put 
together a report that would serve a number of purposes. 
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The term "mental illness" is not mentioned in 77-15-2. However, 
mental disorder, which is mentioned there, has no operational definition 
in the statute. Mental illness does. So I chose to use the term "mental 
illness" because ... there was an agreed upon concrete definition of the 
term that could be referred to, to that if the question were asked, what 
do you mean in that paragraph, I could refer to a definition included in 
the statute. 
Probert: In your answer to your question to yourself, does Mr. Santonio have a 
mental illness within the meaning of section 76-2-305, you say "Yes, 
Mr. Santonio appears to make the diagnosis criteria for delusional 
disorder, persecutory type." Is that a mental disorder? (p.72/12-17) 
Dr. Giles: Yes. 
Probert: What is delusional disorder? (p.76/17-25) 
Dr. Giles: Delusional disorder - sort of the distinguishing between a psychotic 
disorder and a delusional disorder has to do with kinds of things that the 
person is concerned about. Those - a psychotic disorder, a person may 
be concerned about very extreme or fantastical kinds of events. Where 
a delusional disorder, often those things that are concerned about are 
legitimate kinds of things but are not - but are not reasonable to assume 
in the current context. 
Santonio: Dr. Giles, if I had hired an attorney and that attorney took a large sum 
of money from me, put it in his bank account instead of opening a bank 
account for me, like he said, and then quit taking my phone calls and 
wouldn't come to see me at the jail,...would it be reasonable for me 
after that time to have a heightened sense of precaution in hiring other 
counsel? (p. 98/12-20) 
Dr. Giles: Yes. 
R.2969/11 
Santonio: .. .1 don't get the top copy. Mr. Probert has made a copy of the minute 
entry which showed 8:30. I get the third copy, and my third copy had 
the first part of the 8, which looked like a 2, and the second part of the 8 
did not show up. So when I looked at the minute entry it said that my -
my court appearance was scheduled for 2:30. I responded as if it was 
o.an 
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My argument, your honor, is that under the concept of culpability, I was 
acting on what I believed to be the correct time. If it hadn't been for the 
experience on the 7th of August in which I was asked to appear at a time 
that was incorrect and it was proven to be incorrect, then I may not have 
- may not have made this mistake on the 14th. (p. 12/11 -16) 
So I believe that if we look at it from culpability, I'm not culpable. I 
didn't do it knowingly or voluntarily. I addressed the issue as I 
addressed it the week before believing that those efforts would result in 
my being taken to court at the correct time, (p.31/13-17) 
Court: As I look at this, it is possible to see that he might have assumed it was 
a 2 but it also looks like an 8. The bottom line for me is that the 
defendant was present when this hearing was set. It's the only hearing 
he had to be at. He had officers that were telling him that he needed to 
come to court, and he made his own decision that he would not go to 
court. 
My assumption is that if the defendant is called down and is supposed 
to go to court, he'll respond and he'll go, whether or not he thinks the 
officers may or may not be right. There are times that we have people 
come over unnecessarily. We call it "field trips." There are also times 
when we change hearings for one reason or the other, and because it 
happens at the last minute, we may call the jail...and alter the list and 
tell them to bring someone. 
My assumption is that the defendants will obey and come when they are 
asked to come by the jail personnel. I think for me to rule otherwise is 
to open the door to the jail inmates who decide when and if they will 
come to court. 
For those reasons, I will not vacate the order from Judge Davis. 
(p.31/24top.32/21) 
R.2980/10-11 
Kennard: And I would note that there was one concern I had with the jury 
instruction. I think both the defense and the prosecution are in 
agreement that we'll ... we'll get rid of that instruction (p. 10/17-20). 
Court: That was one, I think, the defendant put in. (p. 11/3-11) 
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Kennard: Yea, and I provided him some case law that I felt made that one 
impermissible and apparently he's made the opinion that he's not 
opposed to that one not coming in. 
Court: Okay, let's see if I can find that one and I'll put it out right now. Is it 
after the definitions? 
Kennard: You go elements and then attempt and then you do definitions and it's 
the next one. (Emphasis added) 
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ADDENDUM F 
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ADDENDUM F 
R. 2977/29 
A: He went to get on his bike, I was standing a little close to him, and either his duffle 
bag or the bike hit me, kind of knocked me off balance, at which I drew my service 
revolver,... He was running down the road with his bike trying to jump on. I was able to 
re-holster, run after him, and grab a hold of his arm and take him to the ground. 
Q: ... when you talk about a circumstance of being hit by his bike, can you describe 
that... 
A: He had a great big duffle bag about this wide in the back of it, and I don't know if 
he hit me with it intentionally or not, but it hit me and knocked me off balance. 
And at page 30, line 15: 
Q: ... at that point when you caught up to him? 
A: I was able to grab a hold of his arm, tackle him, take him to the ground, 
We were on the ground for several minutes. I was trying to control his hands, trying to 
get handcuffs on him, was never able to even let go long enough to grab my handcuffs 
from my belt. As time went on, I was getting tired and I lost grip of... his hand, I 
believe that would have been his left hand, and I felt a tug on my gun belt. When I felt 
the tug on my gun belt, I reached down with the hand because I wasn't able to hold it, 
his hand was on the butt of my revolver - or side arm. I pulled it away. At that time he -
I was still holding his left hand - right hand with my left hand, and he was able to grab 
my finger, bend it back. I dislocated my finger at that time, It was excruciating pain. 
In the testimony of Jens Horn, day two of the trial (March 18, 2008) a.m. session, 
he states (transcript p. 83, line 18): 
Q: Now, when you confront a suspect or somebody that you are potentially going to 
arrest, is it your practice to keep your eye focused on him? 
A: Yes. 
Q: ... Now does that mean that officers, or yourself included, would train themselves 
to either pull or replace their revolver without looking down? 
A: Yes, that is correct. 
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And at page 84, line 1: 
Q: And would you also like pull out your mace without looking down if that was 
what you needed to use? 
A: If that's what I needed, yes. 
Q: ...And when you reach for your handcuffs, isn't it also the same, that you do not 
look away from the suspect, you keep your eyes on him: 
A: Yes, that's true. 
And at p. 87, line 2 (reading from his police report of the event) 
A: I had my gun drawn while looking for any weapons in his hands. I saw no 
weapons. At this time I - I was positioned about five to ten feet east of Officer Reynolds 
on the trail. As the suspect continued our direction, he appeared to focus his attention 
of Officer Reynolds. As he passed in front of Reynolds, I began the short run towards 
the suspect intercepting him near the north edge of the trail. In an instant just prior to 
making physical contact with the suspect - with the suspect turned to face me. At that 
time I tackled him to the ground. 
And at page 90, line 1: 
Q: Would you agree that by your statement, the way that you've read it and the way 
that it was written, that you were looking at the ... at the suspect? 
A: Yes, I followed you down off the hill. 
Q: Would you tell us - or - or point to where in your statement that you say that you 
saw him pull a knife? 
A: I never said that in my report, I did not see a weapon. 
In the testimony of the defendant, day two of the trial (R. 2979/68), it states: 
I was stumbling downhill with something hitting my bicycle in the rear. I caught 
in a brief glimpse, ..., just out of the corner of my eye, I caught this big hand -... hitting 
my bicycle with his left hand and he had his gun in his right hand and was still stumbling 
down the hill, ..., until I lost control and fell over. I had somehow in that brief glimpse 
believed that he was hitting my bicycle seat with his hand. 
And at page 69, line 20: 
I careened downhill until I lost control and rolled over on the ground. I was on 
my back. I wras like a turtle. I had my legs up because that's where they landed. They 
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were close to my chest and when the deputy quickly kneeled down by me, he pushed his 
weight against me. 
... I remember his testimony that he had his weight against me and that coincides 
with my recollection of it. And I think that was the time when dirt from the bottom of 
my foot might have got onto his pants. 
And at page 70, line 16: 
He still had his gun out and tried to twist my hands with his left hand,..., but that 
hand was injured and that's when I think he discovered that he had a hand injury is 
when he was trying to twist my hands. 
And at page 74, line 11: 
...I was riding down the canyon, ... I found a place where I could get off the bike 
and lean it up against a post. And I tried to find a place where they couldn't hurt me, 
where I could just sit down and they couldn't get all around me and just jump in there 
and beat me up. And I sat down under a tree. And very shortly after that I saw a deputy 
climbing up that hill not far from me. 
I had opened up my pack and I was trying to get a water bottle out. I was sitting 
there with a hand on the water bottle and a hand in the pack and I was still frozen when 
the deputy spotted me and he began yelling at me, "Show me your hands." I stood up, 
the water bottle and pack in hand. The deputy had his gun out and pointed at me. He 
told me to get down. I started down the hill, the deputy right behind me. I saw officers 
waiting at the bottom of the hill. Their guns were also out pointing at me. 
As I was walking down the hill, I lost my balance and fell down. There was a lot of 
yelling. I don't remember what they said. I stood up. And I think I lost my glasses at that 
point. I moved down toward those deputies which was in my mind in compliance with 
the general direction of what they wanted me to do, and that's when I got knocked down 
by someone who ran into me and landed few feet from me. My testimony is that the 
officer did not land on top of me. 
And again at page 76, line 7: 
... There was yelling, but it was not discernable. 
Then at page 87, line 19: on cross examination, 
Q: ... Do you dispute the fact that he testified that you dislocated his finger? 
A: I do dispute that. I believe that when he hit my bicycle with his left hand, that he 
injured his hand. When he knocked me down, I think that when he tried to twist my 
arm, he discovered an injury. 
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Q: ... Do you dispute Officer Jens Horns' testimony that in tackling you to the 
ground that that circumstance resulted in him receiving a wound to his body? 
A: You know I actually stopped asking Jens Horns questions because of your 
explanation saying that I was not being charged with causing the injury. If I understand 
you correctly, what you're charging me with is using force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury, and that I am contesting. 
And at page 88, line 15: 
Q: Are you disputing his statement that that injury came about from his contact with 
you when he arrested you, when he tackled you to the ground? 
A: You know you're asking me a question that I did not expect to be able to respond 
to except in arguments, but since you've asked me, I will tell you that Mike Reynolds 
says he saw my right hand reach in and pull out something. 
A: And Jens Horns is injured on his right side. My contention in asking for those 
charges to be dropped or dismissed was that a right-handed person would have trouble 
injuring a person on the right-hand side because that are facing their left side. 
Q: Did you have anything to do with the injury that Jens Horn received in your 
mind? 
A: I contend that Jens Horn landed on the ground, not on top of me, but on the 
ground. 
Q: Okay. 
A: ... I surmise because of the angle of the injury that I discerned by looking at the 
evidence that it came like a pencil being slipped into a breast pocket. 
Q: ... Do you challenge the fact... Officer Mike Reynolds testifies that you pulled out 
a knife and that for a period of time you waived this knife at him? 
A: Yes, I do contest that, (misprint in the transcript inserts "contend" for "contest") 
Q: ... So you never pulled a knife? 
A: I'm absolutely sure that I did not reach down and pull out a knife. 
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10/21/2004 State of Utah Crime Laboratory 7 Page 1 
4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 (801) 965-4487 
CL Case No.: C20044169 Agency Case No.: 432153 
Agency: UTS - UTAH COUNTY SO 
ORI: 
Criminalistic Analysis Report - SEROLOGY 
Evidence Submission Information 
Evidence Submitted: 10/15/2004 
How Received: IN PERSON 
Haz. Materials: POSSIBLY BLOOD 
Submitted By: BROWER ph. (801)851-4018 
Delivered By: DOUG HUNTSMAN ph. (801)851-4018 
Received By: KELCEE VENTURA ph. (801)964-4547 
Victims and Suspects 
Vtc/Susp Name DOB Sex Race 
Suspect SANTONIO, AMADOR 01/13/1951 M 
Victim HORN, JENS M 
Crimes 
NCIC Code Description 
1399 ASSAULT (INC: AGRVTD & DOM VIOLENCE) 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY STATEMENT Re: Chain of^ustody 
The item(s) submitted under the police agency case numbers referenced in this report were in a sealed condition at the 
time any examination, testing, or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said examination or handling, if 
any, of the actual items within any such sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity of the 
item to assure that any chance of misidentification, or environmental cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence 
to standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate to any processes applicable to the 
examination, analysis, or testing of said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore is noted below. 
The breaking of any seal or part of the container in which the item was submitted, has been followed by a reinsertion of the 
item into its original container, followed by any examination, testing or analysis and resealing of that container with the 
undersigned's initials placed over such new seal. 
Criminalistic Analysis Report Follows 
^ n r r n n i M PURPOSES ONLY. SoBYTHECOUNTVATTOnNEYTO 
APR 
O^-^jmm 
1 1 I*® 
DEFENDANTS 
03 Q 
« FXH1B1T NO. 
SloRIDEMTlFICWipM 
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10/21/2004 State of Utah Crime Laboratory ' ' Page 2 
4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 (801) 965-4487 
CL Case No.: C20044169 Agency Case No.: 432153 
Agency: UTS - UTAH COUNTY SO 
ORI: 
Criminalistic Analysis Report - SEROLOGY 
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED: 
Item 1: Knife 
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS: 
No indications of blood were detected chemically or upon visual examination 
on Item 1: Knife. 
DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE: 
Item 1: Knife will be returned to the submitting agency. 
^JiAut i . CUc/cA&J 
Teddie L. Critchlow 
Criminalist II 
Thursday, October 21, 2004 
The above interpretation does not represent the totality of the 
criminalist's observations and conclusions. Further questions and/or 
discussion is encouraged. 
FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES ONLY. 
RELEASED BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY TO 
APR 1 1 2005 
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Kay Bryson #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
L. Guy Probert #7284 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801)370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMADOR SANTONIO 
Defendant. 
CERTIFIED COPY OF FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY IN 
CASE NO 2: 00CR-90-C 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
Case No. 031402469 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
COMES the Plaintiff by and through its attorney L. Guy Probert and files a certified copy 
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law on defendant's competency in Case No: 2: 00CR-
90-C in the United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division in the case entitled 
United States of America v. Amador Santonio. " 
/ \ > kr^ 
L. Guy Probert 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
DEFENDANT'S 
: EXHIBIT NO.. 
. i-or> mCMTIClPATinW 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AMADOR SANTONIO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY 
Case No. 2: 00CR-90-C 
ludge Tena Campbell 
On October 17, 2000, an evidentiary hearing was held before this Court pursuant to the 
Court's order that a pretrial psychiatric and/or psychological examination, as provided in 18 
U.S.C. § 4241(a) and 4247 (b), be conducted to determine the mental competence of the 
Defendant, Amador Santonio in the above-entitled matter. The Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Rebecca C. Hyde and Richard MacDougall, and the government was 
represented by Michele M. Christiansen. The Court, having reviewed the Forensic Evaluation 
provided by Dr. Ralph Ihle, heard the testimony of Dr. Ihle at the hearing, observed the 
demeanor of the defendant at the hearing, and having fully reviewed the matter, enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
v 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Despite Defendant's unwillingness to cooperate with evaluators, there is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the Defendant, Amador Santonio, is suffering from a mental disease or 
defect manifesting ongoing paranoid psychotic thought processes. 
2. This conclusion is based on Dr. Ihle's report, the letters in the file written by Mr. 
Santonio, and observations of Mr. Santonio by the court during the various hearings where Mr. 
Santonio was present and spoke at length. 
3. Further local testing or attempts to conduct testing would be of little benefit to 
evaluators, or the court, in that formal testing is likely to reveal that Mr. Santonio is of above 
average intelligence, but will shed little light on his paranoid thought process. 
4. Mr. Santonio exhibits grandiose, paranoid thought processes of conspiracies 
involving, judges, congressmen, the President, FBI, movie stars and others. 
5. Mr. Santonio exhibits many ideas of reference. In other words, he believes casual or 
external events have a particular, unusual significance to him. 
6. Because of Mr. Santonio's persecutory, delusional thought processes, his demeanor is 
uncooperative, withdrawn, and hostile towards medical staff and his attorney. 
7. Although Mr. Santonio appears to be well-versed in various legal precedents and 
concepts, it is clear that he could not assist his attorney in his defense. That is, because of Mr. 
Santonio's paranoid delusions, he is unable to realistically appraise his behavior or reality, 
cooperate with his attorney, or behave in a rational, logical manner. 
? 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, Amador 
Santonio, is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him incompetent to 
proceed to trial at this point. 
2. Mr. Santonio is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings 
against him or to assist properly in his defense at this time. 
ORDER 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby ORDERS the following: 
1. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 (d), Mr. Santonio is hereby committed to the custody of 
the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize Mr. Santonio for observation and 
psycho social treatment in a suitable facility for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 
four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the 
foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed. 
2. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c), a psychiatric and/or psychological report shall be 
filed with the Court. 
3. The United States Attorney shall pay for this pretrial psychiatric and/or psychological 
treatment. 
4. The Speedy Tnal time shall be tolled pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § § 3161(h)(1)(a) and 
3161(h)(8)(A) on the grounds that the United States Bureau of Prisons has adequate and essential 
3 
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facilities to provide treatment to restore the mental competency of Mr. Santonio. Failure to 
grant a continuance under the Speedy Trial Act would render continuation of these proceedings 
impossible because Mr. Santonio's mental competency is integral to participation in trial, 
entering a guilty plea, and other critical stages of the proceedings. For this reason, the ends of 
justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and Mr. 
Santonio in a speedy trial. 
This Court further ORDERS that a psychological examination of Mr. Santonio be 
conducted for the purposes of determining the existence of insanity at the time of the offense, 
during the time period of February 23, 1999 through February 4, 2000, pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 4242. Medical staff at the facility where defendant is to be evaluated are authorized 
to provide any treatment deemed medically necessary in order to facilitate maintaining the 
competency of Mr. Santonio for purposes of the evaluation. 
This Court further RECOMMENDS that the pretrial psychiatric and/or psychological 
treatment to restore mental competency take place at the Federal Medical Facility, U.S. Bureau 
of Prisons-Springfield, Missouri by appropriate personnel. 
Dated this §Q day of October, 2000. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
U J? 
ytr^i uw^f^ 
• o o - o - d r t ^ ^ . TENA CAMPBELL, 
-••_•• --o document is a true 
-• o:?o;no! on Hie in this office. United States District Court Judge 
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alf 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
November 1, 2 0 00 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:00 -cr-00090 
True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed or faxed by the 
clerk to the following: 
US Probation 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
JFAX 9,5261136 
USMS 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
JFAX 9,5244048 
Michele M. Christiansen, Esq. 
US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
JFAX 9,5245985 
Rebecca C. Hyde, Esq. 
UTAH FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE 
46 W BROADWAY STE 110 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
JFAX 9,5244023 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on the ^0 r^- £)ay 0f 
October, 2003 
Mr Mike Esplin 
Aldrich Nelson Weight & Esplin 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo Ut 84603-0200 
Amador Santonio 
Utah County Jail 
3075 Northy Main Street, 
Spanish Fork, Ut 84660 
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JEFFREY R. BUHMAN #7041 
Utah County Attorney 
Randy Kennard #7907 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 851-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i MOTION TO RE-DIRECT EVALUATION 
| OF DEFENDANT 
! CaseNos. 031402469 
AMADOR SANTONIO, 
Defendant. 
It is apparent that Dr. Wooten's evaluation failed to address the issue at point of whether 
at the time the Defendant is alleged to have committed these offenses he lacked the mental 
capacity to form an intent to commit these crimes; i.e. he was not guilty by reason of insanity. 
(Dr. Wooten's evaluation appears to erroneously focus on factors related to release from 
commitment to the state hospital after a finding of insanity.) The Plaintiff moves the Court to re-
order the evaluator give his expert opinion as to these allegations. Attached is a proposed order. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
T» _ _ _ 1 _ r A 
rcme I oi H 
• - - 2.21 n 
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DATED Setftembe^, 2007 / 
Randy Kennaf 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
( X ) sent via first class mail, postage prepaid to the following (9/24/07): 
( ) sent via inter-office mail, to the following: 
( X ) hand delivered on (9/25/07) to the following: 
( ) faxed to the following: 
Amador Santonio 
Inmate, Utah County Jail 
3075 North Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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SEP 2 5 2007 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMADOR SANTONIO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR EVALUATION, 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-16a-301 
Case No. 031402469 
Judge: Claudia Laycock 
Division 3 
The defendant, Amador Santonio, appeared before this court on September 12, 2007. 
Randy Kennard, Deputy Utah County Attorney, appeared on behalf of the State. During that 
hearing, the defendant entered not guilty by reason of insanity pleas to all of the charges in the 
Amended Information, which was filed at the time of the preliminary hearing and is attached to 
this Order. The court, having received notice through the defendant's pleas that he intends to 
claim that (1) he is not guilty by reason of insanity, or that (2) he had diminished mental capacity, 
or that (3) he intends to assert special mitigation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5, now makes 
the following Order pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-301: 
ORDER 
1. (a) The court orders the Department of Human Services to examine the defendant and 
investigate his mental condition, 
(b) The person or organization directed by the department to conduct the examination 
1 
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shall testify at the request of the court or either party in any proceeding in which the 
testimony is otherwise admissible. 
(c) Pending trial the defendant shall be retained in the same custody or status he was in at 
the time the examination was ordered, i.e., the Utah County Jail. 
2. (a) The defendant shall make himself available and fully cooperate in the examination by 
the department and any other independent examiners for the defense and the prosecuting attorney. 
(b) If the defendant fails to make himself available and fully cooperate, and that failure is 
established to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial, the defendant is 
barred from presenting expert testimony relating to his defense of mental illness at the 
trial of the case. 
(c) The department shall complete the examination within 30 days and shall prepare and 
provide to the court, the Utah County Attorney's Office, and the defendant a written 
report concerning the condition of the defendant. 
3. Within ten days after receipt of the report from the department, but not later than five 
days before the trial of the case, the Utah County Attorney's Office shall file and serve 
upon the defendant a notice of rebuttal of the defense of mental illness, which shall 
contain the names of witnesses the prosecuting attorney proposes to call in rebuttal. 
4. The reports of any other independent examiner are admissible as evidence upon 
stipulation of the prosecution and defense. 
5. This section does not prevent any party from producing any other testimony as to the 
2 
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mental condition of the defendant. Expert witnesses who are not appointed by the court 
are not entitled to compensation under Subsection (7). 
6. This section does not require the admission of evidence not otherwise admissible. 
7. Expenses of examination ordered by the court under this section shall be paid by the 
Department of Human Services. Travel expenses associated with the examination* 
incurred by the defendant shall be charged by the department to the county where 
prosecution was commenced. 
8. Without delay, each party shall provide to the Department of Human Services, through 
Danette Faretta-Brady at the Utah State Hospital, all reports and other materials deemed 
necessary by the parties for a complete examination of the defendant. 
9. The examination shall be completed and the written reports delivered prior to the next 
hearing in the matter, which shall be Wednesday, October 24, 2007 at 4:00 p.m. 
DATED this day of September, 2007. • 
BY THE COURT: 
3 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
n 
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ruling was mailed on J?6 August 2007 to the 
following: 
Randy Kennard 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
(Hand-delivered) 
Amador Santonio 
Utah County Jail 
(Faxed and Mailed) / ^XFlN^a 
£L'*C 
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OCT 0 8 2007 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMADOR SANTONIO, 
Defendant. ' 
AMENDED ORDER FOR 
EVALUATION, PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-301 
Case No. 031402469 
Judge: Claudia Laycock 
Division 3 
Date: October 3,2007 
The defendant, Amador Santonio, appeared before this court on September 12,2007. 
Randy Kennard, Deputy Utah County Attorney, appeared on behalf of the State. During that 
hearing, the defendant entered not guilty by reason of insanity pleas to all of the charges in the 
Amended Information, which was filed at the time of the preliminary hearing and is attached to 
this Order. The court, having received notice through the defendant's pleas that he intends to 
claim that (1) he is not guilty by reason of insanity, or that (2) he had diminished mental capacity, 
or that (3) he intends to assert special mitigation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5, now makes 
the following Order pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-301: 
ORDER 
1. (a) The court orders the Department of Human Services to examine the defendant and 
investigate his mental condition at the time of the offense, 
(b) The person or organization directed by the department to conduct the examination 
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shall testify at the request of the court or either party in any proceeding in which the 
testimony is otherwise admissible. 
(c) Pending trial the defendant shall be retained in the same custody or status he was in at 
the time the examination was ordered, i.e., the Utah County Jail. 
2. (a) The defendant shall make himself available and fully cooperate in the examination by 
the department and any other independent examiners for the defense and the prosecuting attorney. 
(b) If the defendant fails to make himself available and fully cooperate, and that failure is 
established to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial, the defendant is 
barred from presenting expert testimony relating to his defense of mental illness at the 
trial of the case. 
(c) The department shall complete the examination within 30 days and shall prepare and 
provide to the court, the Utah County Attorney's Office, and the defendant a written 
report concerning the condition of the defendant at the time of the offense. 
3. Within ten days after receipt of the report from the department, but not later than five 
days before the trial of the case, the Utah County Attorney's Office shall file and serve 
upon the defendant a notice of rebuttal of the defense of mental illness, which shall 
contain the names of witnesses the prosecuting attorney proposes to call in rebuttal. 
4. The reports of any other independent examiner are admissible as evidence upon 
stipulation of the prosecution and defense. 
5. This section does not prevent any party from producing any other testimony as to the 
2
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mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense. Expert witnesses who are 
not appointed by the court are not entitled to compensation under Subsection (7). 
6. This section does not require the admission of evidence not otherwise admissible. 
7. Expenses of examination ordered by the court under this section shall be paid by the 
Department of Human Services. Travel expenses associated with the examination 
incurred by the defendant shall be charged by the department to the county where 
prosecution was commenced. 
8. Without delay, each party shall provide to the Department of Human Services, through 
Danette Faretta-Brady at the Utah State Hospital, all reports and other materials deemed 
necessary by the parties for a complete examination of the defendant. 
9. The examination shall be completed and the written reports delivered prior to the next 
hearing in the matter, which shall be Wednesday, October 24, 2007 at 4:00 p.m. 
DATED this .day of October, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
^WT^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ruling was mailed on. ^ October 2007 to the 
following: 
Randy Kennard 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
(Hand-delivered) 
Amador Santonio 
Utah County Jail 
(Faxed and Mailed) 
6*:0 ast^tL; /m^^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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